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Abstract 
Numerous decision-making barriers prevent or delay climate and extreme 
weather resilience investments. Port decision-makers’ perceptions of such 
barriers are important for proactive strategies for reducing coastal 
vulnerability and supporting safe and sustainable operations of U.S. ports. 
This report identifies the perceived adaptation barriers for seaports, and 
strategies to remove them. Interviews with 30 directors/managers, 
environmental specialists, and safety planners at 15 medium- and high-use 
ports of the North Atlantic resulted in a typology of factors and conditions 
that hamper adaptation actions, planning, and perceived strategies to 
overcome these barriers.  
This study finds that the decision-makers have consensus on seven 
overarching barriers to adaptation: the lack of understanding of the risks 
(93%), lack of funding (77%), perceived levels of risks do not exceed the 
action threshold (70%), governance disconnect (67%), physical constraints 
(67%), lack of communication amongst individuals (7%), and the problem 
(of adaptation) is overwhelming (7%). 
For strategies to overcome the adaptation barriers, the study points to the 
importance of fostering collaborations, making regulatory changes, and 
conducting risk assessments. Port decision-makers also mentioned the 
need for developing financial incentives and taking advantage of 
communication networks as necessary strategies to implement climate 
and extreme weather adaptations. 
DISCLAIMER: The contents of this report are not to be used for advertising, publication, or promotional purposes. 
Citation of trade names does not constitute an official endorsement or approval of the use of such commercial products. 
All product names and trademarks cited are the property of their respective owners. The findings of this report are not to 
be construed as an official Department of the Army position unless so designated by other authorized documents. 
 
DESTROY THIS REPORT WHEN NO LONGER NEEDED. DO NOT RETURN IT TO THE ORIGINATOR. 
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Executive Summary 
Stakeholders of the maritime transportation system are becoming more 
aware of the importance of building and strengthening the resilience of 
coastal infrastructure. Heavy rains, storms, sea level rise, and extreme 
heat damage coastal critical infrastructures (Melillo et al. 2014). The 
frequency, intensity, timing, duration, and location of such climate and 
extreme weather events will define how the U.S. maritime transportation 
system experiences future impacts. However, information on barriers to 
building resilience for ports is limited. 
Climate change studies stress that decision-making barriers slow the 
development and implementation of much-needed adaptation strategies 
(Moser and Ekstrom 2010; Biesbroek et al. 2011). For this reason, 
examining decision-maker perceptions of adaptation barriers is key to the 
implementation of plans and effort to reduce risks and build the resilience 
of ports.  
Barriers are defined as factors or conditions that impede, prevent, or 
delay processes for the development and implementation of climate 
change adaptation strategies (Biesbroek et al. 2011). Barriers to resilience 
investment include underestimating true risk levels, lack of financing, lack 
of awareness, and misaligned incentives (Moser and Ekstrom 2010; 
Biesbroek et al. 2011). At the national and global levels, trade and 
development rely on the efficient operation of maritime transportation1. 
Still, decision-makers have not yet made sufficient investments towards 
climate and extreme weather resilience (Biesbroek et al. 2011), as seen 
recently with the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy at the port of New York 
and New Jersey (Greene et al. 2013; Becker et al. 2014; Becker 2016; Ng et 
al. 2016), and earlier in Gulfport, MS, during Hurricane Katrina (2005) 
(USDOT 2013). Differences in stakeholders’ risk perceptions can be a 
source of conflict in the deliberations and planning. This research focuses 
on identifying the perceived barriers and how three categories of key port 
decision-makers think about those barriers, as well as about the strategies 
needed to overcome them.  
                                                                
1 Asariotis, R., H. Benamara, and V. Mohos-Naray. 2017. Port Industry Survey on Climate Change Impacts 
and Adaptation. UNCTAD Research Paper No. 18. United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development. 
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This study characterizes the barriers to climate and extreme weather 
adaptations for ports and suggests approaches to develop adaptation 
strategies that encourage long-term resilience planning. Adaptation 
strategies minimize vulnerability to natural hazards (Nicholls et al. 2008). 
Reactive mitigation, currently the dominant adaptation strategy 
(Measham et al. 2011), leaves coastal communities at risk and threatens 
the stability of their economy, environment, and human safety. Hence, 
seaport planners and managers need to plan, implement, and monitor 
pro-active adaptations to enhance the resilience of these ports 
(DHS 2009). 
This work is part of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Project 
W912HZ-16-C-0019 entitled “Measuring Climate and Extreme Weather 
Vulnerability to Inform Resilience.” This report captures the first of a two-
part study. In the first part of the study (McIntosh et al. [2019], Measuring 
Climate and Extreme Weather Vulnerability to Inform Resilience: Report 
1: Pilot Study for North Atlantic Medium- and High-Use Maritime 
Freight Nodes), experts ranked higher the use of exposure and sensitivity 
indicators as measures of ports vulnerability. This report is a summary of 
the second part of the study. It focuses on adaptive capacity — the third 
component of vulnerability — and in particular on barriers to adaptation. 
To identify seaport decision-makers’ perceived barriers to adaptations, 
port directors/managers, environmental specialists and safety planners in 
15 of the 22 medium- and high-use ports of the USACE North Atlantic 
Division were interviewed. Researchers also asked decision-makers about 
resources and strategies that could help remove the barriers to adaptation. 
A cultural consensus model (CCM) characterizes the barriers identified 
during the interviews within the larger context of the port community’s 
resilience. The CCM measures levels of agreement for the top barriers 
identified by the participating decision-makers.  
Outlining how the decision-makers perceive those barriers is fundamental 
for implementing actions to reduce risk and enhance the port’s resilience. 
Climate change studies stress that decision-making barriers slow the 
development and implementation of much-needed adaptation strategies 
(Moser and Ekstrom 2010; Biesbroek et al. 2011). Other studies have 
relied on stakeholders’ views to assess flood risk (Van Kleef et al. 2007), 
impacts of sea level rise (SLR) (Poumadère et al. 2008), as well as how 
stakeholders are impacted by the strike of storms (Becker et al. 2014). 
Already, ports and critical coastal infrastructures are damaged by heavy 
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rains, storms, SLR, and extreme heat damage (Melillo et al. 2014). To 
illustrate the challenge of adaptation, Moser and Ekstrom (2010) defined 
how the barriers can appear in different phases, from (1) the 
Understanding phase, (2) the Planning phase, and (3) the Management 
phase. Some studies indicate that there will always be barriers to 
adaptation, but that, different from a limitation, by definition, a barrier 
can be overcome through planning efforts, creative thinking, and the 
prioritizations of resources (Moser and Ekstrom 2010).  
The following paragraphs present findings from this study, including 
barriers to adaptation, followed by the strategies that can help them 
overcome the identified barriers and concluding with recommendations to 
the U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center, and port 
decision-makers. By connecting the barriers to adaptation and the 
strategies needed to address them, this pilot study provides a framework 
to guide future port adaptation capacity-building actions.  
Seven perceived barriers 
This study identified and then measured consensus on seven perceived 
barriers to adaptation to climate and extreme weather (see figure on 
following page). It focused on three principle decision-maker types at 
medium- and high-use ports on the North Atlantic Coast: port directors, 
environmental specialists, and safety planners. Perceived barriers 
identified by this group include (1) the lack of understanding of the risks, 
(2) lack of funding, (3) perceived levels of risks do not exceed the action 
threshold, (4) governance disconnect, (5) physical constraints, (6) lack of 
communication amongst individuals, and (7) the problem (of adaptation) 
is overwhelming. 
 
A higher percentage of port directors identified lack of 
understanding and governance disconnect in their responses 
about barriers; a higher percentage of the environmental 
specialists highlighted the lack of understanding and the 
physical constraints of the ports as barriers; and more safety 
planners mentioned the lack of funding and perceived risks do 
not exceed the action threshold as the barriers of concern (see 
figure on following page).  
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Seven barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptations resulted from 30 interviews in 15 
North Atlantic ports. The value above each color is the percentage of respondents that 
mentioned that barrier within the decision-makers category (directors/managers, 
environmental specialists, safety planners). Blue numbers represent the total frequency of 
the responses (n = 30). Blue represents the overall percentage of responses for a barrier. 
(Graph credit: J. Menendez Lopez). 
 
Five strategies to address barriers 
The respondents also identified five strategies that could help them 
address the barriers to adaptation: (1) foster collaborations, (2) make 
regulatory changes, (3) conduct risk assessments, (4) develop financial 
incentives, and (5) use new technology to enhance communication 
network (see figure on following page). 
 
A higher number of directors and environmental specialists 
highlighted the importance of fostering collaborations and 
making regulatory changes to encourage resilience planning. 
Safety planners agreed, and they highlighted the need to 
conduct risk assessments (see figure on following page). 
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Five strategies to overcome barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptations resulted 
from 30 interviews in 15 North Atlantic ports. The value above each color is the percentage of 
respondents that mentioned that strategy within the decision-makers category 
(directors/managers, environmental specialists, safety planners). Red numbers represent the 
total frequency of the responses (n = 30). Red represents the overall percentage of 
responses for a barrier. (Graph credit: J. Menendez Lopez). 
 
Key recommendations 
Addressing the barriers relies on private and public port entities to 
communicate and collaborate at the local, state, and national levels with 
institutions and agencies that have a vested interest in the ports. To 
address barriers to adaptation at the port level, this study recommends for 
USACE, policy makers, and other institutions do the following: (1) make 
regulatory changes to encourage resilience and provide financial 
incentives, (2) integrate risk assessment into the port management plan or 
conduct independent risk management assessment, (3) establish working 
groups and emergency response strategies for different natural hazards 
(flood barriers, etc.), and (4) enhance learning and data availability 
through collaborations (organizations, academics, government, etc.).  
Directors and managers can play leadership roles in directing the 
environmental specialists and the safety planners to work together on risk 
assessment reports for the ports. The environmental specialists and the 
safety planners can promote the establishment of partnerships and 
collaborations that enable them to learn from ports that have more 
experience with storms, floods, or other natural hazards.  
ERDC/CHL CR-19-3 xiii 
More work is needed to integrate a larger number of port stakeholders in 
the conversation, to make clear connections not only on what the barriers to 
adaptation are but also on who has the responsibility to remove them. 
Efforts should expand to understand risks at the port and their neighboring 
communities. The development of the approach and research methods used 
in this study can be used in other regions to measure consensus on barriers 
to adaptation and the strategies needed to overcome them.
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1 Introduction  
Coastal communities are experiencing worsening impacts from climate 
change-related natural hazards (Melillo et al. 2014). Although changes in 
the climate and extreme weather events are inevitable (Melillo et al. 2014; 
IPCC 2012), the magnitude of the damage to coastal areas and the critical 
infrastructure located there can be reduced through the implementation of 
climate and extreme weather adaptations (Füssel 2007). Seaports are 
critical infrastructure. At the national and global levels, trade and 
development rely on the efficient operation of maritime transportation1. 
To sustain these operations, it is vital that port decision-makers 
understand the risks and plan for potential impact. Because U.S. port 
resilience planning currently falls primarily upon port operators (Becker 
and Caldwell 2015), those equipped with knowledge about adaptation 
strategies can minimize their vulnerability to natural hazards (Nicholls et 
al. 2008).  
Over a decade ago, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) remarked that there were “research challenges in understanding 
the processes by which adaptation is occurring and will occur in the 
future”(IPCC 2007). Social scientists, in response, researched barriers to 
climate change adaptation and are developing theories to help understand 
them (Moser and Ekstrom 2010). Recent investigations stress that 
decision-making barriers slow the implementation of adaptation strategies 
(Moser and Ekstrom 2010; Biesbroek et al. 2011; Becker 2013). Such 
barriers include underestimating risk levels, lack of financing, lack of 
awareness, and misaligned incentives (Moser and Ekstrom 2010; 
Biesbroek et al. 2011). 
This research builds on these theories of resilience barriers and ground 
truth findings from the indicator-based vulnerability assessment 
methodology developed for the 22 seaports that fall within the boundaries 
of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) North Atlantic Division 
(CENAD) (McIntosh et al. 2018). Through literature reviews, a 
compilation of databases, and an iterative, expert-driven process, a 
                                                                
1 Asariotis, R., H. Benamara, and V. Mohos-Naray. 2017. Port Industry Survey on Climate Change Impacts 
and Adaptation. UNCTAD Research Paper No. 18. United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development. 
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vulnerability indicator method that integrates 12 specific indicators was 
used for a comparative assessment of the vulnerability of the 22 ports in 
the North Atlantic (McIntosh et al. 2018). The indicators selected by the 
expert panel identified aspects of exposure and sensitivity, which are just 
two of the three components that comprise the concept of vulnerability 
(IPCC 2001). The final component, adaptive capacity, was not included in 
the index project, as no suitable indicators could be found for adaptive 
capacity. Hence, this research focuses on decision-makers’ perceived 
barriers to adaptation for climate and extreme weather and considers 
adaptive capacity from the perspective of the perceived needs and 
challenges port decision-makers face when considering implementation of 
resilience investments. Specifically, what are the barriers preventing the 
integration of adaptive capacity to reduce the risk from climate and 
extreme weather events? 
To identify seaport decision-makers’ perceived barriers to climate and 
extreme weather adaptations, this project interviewed 30 port 
directors/managers, environmental specialists, and safety planners from 
15 of the 22 medium- and high-use ports within the USACE North Atlantic 
Division (Figure 2). The remaining seven ports declined when invited to 
participate. This project focuses on ports but recognizes that barriers to 
adaptation also need to be considered in the context of a larger system. 
Through analysis of the interviews and a literature review on barriers and 
strategies to climate adaptation, a port-specific typology of barriers to 
climate and extreme weather adaptation was developed.  
Following the Abstract and the Executive Summary of this report, Chapter 
1 introduces the study, and Chapters 2 and 3 outline the objectives and the 
methods used to identify the key barriers to adaptation and the strategies 
to help port decision-makers overcome them. The report next describes 
the steps for the data analysis. Once the barriers were coded, a cultural 
consensus model (CCM) was used to identify and outline gaps and 
patterns of socially transmitted knowledge — the knowledge people use to 
interpret the world in making decisions that affect coastal cities and 
beyond (Romney et al. 1987). 
The study also explored resources and strategies that the decision-makers 
identified as essential to helping them overcome the perceived barriers. 
Suggestions are offered on the role decision-makers could play to facilitate 
and implement the various strategies. Results for the different decision-
ERDC/CHL CR-19-?? 3 
maker categories are presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses the 
barriers and the strategies to address them. The final section includes 
recommendations for resilience planning for port decision-makers, with 
the support of other agencies and organizations, and recommendations for 
future work (Chapter 6). 
Additionally, to further ground truth aspects of the seaport vulnerability 
indicator methodology developed by (McIntosh et al. 2018), interview 
questions on how decision-makers perceive seaport vulnerability in the 
context of climate and extreme weather were included. In brief, the 
assessment finds that 80% of the 30 respondents explain port 
vulnerability in terms of only exposure and sensitivity — these are two of 
the vulnerability components, and only 30% talked about seaport 
vulnerability in terms of the third component, adaptive capacity. The 
responses by the directors and the environmental specialists followed the 
pattern mentioned above. However, safety planners explained 
vulnerability in terms of all three components, including adaptive capacity, 
more than the other decision-makers (80%, 4/5). More details are 
presented in Appendix A. 
This research responds to the call to increase resilience and protect 
national critical infrastructure (Obama 2013) by assessing perceived 
barriers to extreme weather adaptation for ports. These study results can 
assist government agencies and port operators to understand and prepare 
for extreme weather events for the benefit of all who depend on a resilient 
maritime transportation system. 
1.1 Barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptation 
1.1.1 How are barriers defined? 
The research in this study addresses barriers to adapt ports and port 
systems to the impacts of climate change, sea level rise (SLR), more 
frequent storms, increased storm intensity, and other extreme weather 
events. In 2007, the IPCC noted there were barriers that could impede 
implementation of climate change adaptation. At that time, barrier was 
defined as “any obstacle to reaching a potential that can be overcome by 
policies and measures,” or as challenges that impede adaptation (IPCC 
2007, Section 2.4.3). Barriers are often discussed in tandem with the term 
opportunity — “the application of technologies or policies to reduce costs 
and barriers, [to] find new potentials and increase existing ones” (IPCC 
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2007, Section 2.4.3.1). This potential for barriers and opportunities can 
vary across places and over time because they tend to be context specific 
(IPCC 2007). 
In this study, barriers1 are factors and conditions that impede, prevent, or 
delay processes for the development and implementation of climate 
change adaptation strategies for seaport systems (Biesbroek et al. 2011). In 
the literature, examples of these barriers include uncertainty, the cost of 
adaptation measures, fragmentation, rigidity, unawareness, lack of data, 
lack of national attention to climate change (Smith et al. 2009), as well as 
socio-cultural barriers and institutional barriers to action (Burch 2010). 
While research suggests that such barriers can be “overcome with 
concerted effort and creative management (Moser and Ekstrom 2010), 
there is no specific guidance for barriers that seaport decision-makers 
might face.  
The challenge is that barriers “make adaptation efforts less efficient” and 
more difficult to achieve progress towards adaptation (Biesbroek et al. 
2011; Huang 2012; Ekstrom and Moser 2014). As a result, some 
researchers have developed frameworks to diagnose barriers to climate 
change adaptation with a focus on planned adaptation (Moser and 
Ekstrom 2010). As the backdrop to identifying where barriers to adaption 
arise, they use an idealized stage for an adaptation planning process that 
includes (1) understanding the problem, (2) planning an option, and (3) 
managing or monitoring the effects of their actions. Ekstrom and Moser 
later tested the theoretical framework focusing on three potential sources 
of barriers: the actors (making decisions), the context (social, economic, or 
biophysical), and the system that is at risk of being impacted. Through 
these efforts, they found the most frequent barriers to be related to 
institutional governance and funding concerns. Additionally, these 
identified barriers were influenced by the attitudes, values, and 
motivations of the actors involved. Others agree that barriers are relative 
to a specific adaptive action, to the actor that can put them forward, and to 
the situation in which the action is taken (Eisenack and Stecker 2012; 
Moser and Ekstrom 2010).  
                                                                
1 The definition of barriers and the main terminology used throughout this report can be found in 
Appendix E. 
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1.1.2 Some examples of barriers 
In the academic literature on climate adaptation, the most frequently 
reported barriers relate to the institutional and social dimensions building 
resilience. Barriers can relate to how risk is understood in the context of 
planning for, managing, and implementing resilience strategies (Moser 
and Ekstrom 2010) or as a function of where they arise in the adaptation 
process (Biesbroek et al. 2013). Social barriers to adaptation relate to 
challenges in institutional governance (Ekstrom and Moser 2014) or the 
persistent problem of institutional fragmentation (Ekstrom and Moser 
2014; Huitema et al. 2008), especially inside multi-entity organizations 
where different sectors need to interact and communicate to implement 
adaptation strategies. Other barriers are described as technical, for 
example when staff lacks the expertise or training to address a problem, or 
biophysical limitations, for example an absence of information on the 
biology or physical landscapes that leads to maladaptation (Moser and 
Ekstrom 2010).  
Barriers can also be linked to specific planning actions and include scarce 
financial resources, limited training, conflicting timescales, governance 
fragmentation, the uncertainty of societal costs, or the future benefits of 
adaptations (Biesbroek et al. 2011). As an example, conflicting timescales 
happen when other issues have a more pressing nature and decision-
makers are confronted with what to prioritize first. In general, the 
“traditional long-term planning [horizon] found in strategic policy 
documents (20 to 30 years) is preferred to having to plan for the long-term 
impacts of (an uncertain) climate change (100 years or more)”(Biesbroek 
et al. 2011). Lack, or inaccessibility, of resources can also be a significant 
barrier to climate adaptation (Füssel 2007), as many adaptation strategies 
are very expensive and have less-clear direct benefits. 
In the context of decision-making, identifying barriers to climate change 
adaptations can be challenging due to factors such as the differences 
between the long-term impacts of climate change versus the short-term 
weather patterns; the need for better scientific models for predictions; and 
the inherent uncertainties of climate (Biesbroek et al. 2013). 
In responding to what these barriers are, researchers also seek to explain 
society’s ability to overcome barriers, and many studies categorize barriers 
to help determine where appropriate interventions can be targeted (Moser 
and Ekstrom 2010; Biesbroek et al. 2011; Biesbroek et al. 2013; Ekstrom 
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and Moser 2014). In general, studies suggest that barriers to adaptation 
need to be understood in the context of society’s ability to address them 
(Burton 2009; Adger et al. 2008), recognizing a latent adaptive capacity 
that is best explained as inaction (Biesbroek et al. 2013).  
For ports, a number of barriers to climate adaptation have been evaluated 
(Becker and Caldwell 2015). These barriers include “organizational 
inconsistencies with regards to planning timeframes (5 - 15 years) 
compared with climate projections of 30 - 90 years”; then, there is the 
uncertainty of local climate projections that results in decision-makers 
delaying action until a later time — when there is perceived to be more 
certainty.  
There will always be barriers to change, but barriers can be transformed. 
While a limitation is considered to be “absolute and unsurpassable,” 
barriers are “mutable and surmountable” (Moser and Ekstrom 2010). To 
achieve successful adaptations, decision-makers need to not only 
understand the issues but also to increase their ability to navigate the 
labyrinth of barriers that emerge in the governance of adaptation (Adger 
and Barnett 2009; Adger et al. 2009; Moser and Ekstrom 2010) 
1.2 Strategies to overcome the barriers to climate and extreme 
weather adaptations 
Adaptation, as defined by the IPCC, means “any adjustment in natural or 
human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their 
effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities” (IPCC 
2012). In this study, adaptation to climate and extreme weather is defined 
as actions decision-makers implement to respond to a predicted or 
projected natural hazard impact. These actions reduce the risk and 
increase the resilience of the port and are generally part of an ongoing 
process. Unfortunately, adaptation actions often take the form of reactive 
mitigation (after an event) rather than pro-active actions (before an event 
occurs). This adaptation strategy, though dominant (Measham et al. 2011), 
leaves coasts and communities vulnerable to future impacts (Measham et 
al. 2011; Burch 2010). For this reason, decision-making, adaptation 
strategies that overcome barriers can benefit from “leadership strategic 
thinking, resourcefulness, creativity, collaboration and effective 
communication” (Moser and Ekstrom 2011).  
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In 2011, the United Kingdom Climate Impact Program used a 
risk/vulnerability approach to understand climate adaptations. It integrated 
current-day vulnerabilities to extreme weather events with an assessment of 
future climatic risks and resulted in two adaptation categories (Scott et al. 
2013). The first builds capacity for future changes through awareness 
raising, skill development, data collecting, monitoring and research, and the 
second implements adaptation initiatives such as technological, engineering 
changes, planning, design, legal/regulatory, insurance/financial measures, 
and management system change (UKCIP 2011). 
States that have experienced disasters are already at the forefront of 
climate change policy. For example, in 2011, after severe storms and floods 
of 2010, the state of Rhode Island formed a state Climate Commission 
(RICCC 2012) and adopted an SLR policy for the state (in draft form at the 
time of the interviews) (CRMC 2009).  
In 2012, researchers published work on “transformational adaptation” 
strategies (Kates et al. 2012). These are strategies that are much larger in 
scale and may transform a place or initiate a major shift in location (Kates 
et al. 2012).  
Although in recent years the number of studies on adaptation in the 
context of climate has increased on scientific and policy agendas (Adger et 
al. 2007), numerous researchers have tried to explain the commonly 
observed “adaptation deficit”(Burton 2009) when needed adaptations are 
identified but their implementation is missing. The National Research 
Council notes that this deficit in adaptation is not only observed for 
developing countries but also in developed nations (NRC 2010). 
1.3 Strategies for seaports 
Seaports facilitate the exchange of goods and benefit for regional and 
national economies and social systems. Ports serve many different 
stakeholders and contribute to diverse goals that include “providing 
economic benefits, environmental protection, improving quality of life, 
reducing tax burdens, facilitating trade,” etc. (Winkelmans and Notteboom 
2007). Therefore, when a natural disaster strikes a port, many 
stakeholders are affected directly and indirectly (Becker et al 2014).  
In a recent study, surveyed port administrators around the world felt that 
adaptation measures should be taken into account when ports construct 
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new infrastructure (Becker et al. 2011). Mississippi offers a recent 
example. After Hurricane Katrina destroyed the port of Gulfport, the port 
authority adopted a plan to elevate the entire infrastructure from 10 feet to 
25 feet above mean sea level to enhance resilience to storms. In this case, 
$140 million was proposed to invest in structural resilience (Becker and 
Caldwell 2015). However, this strategy was never implemented, and funds 
originally allocated for the project were redirected to a channel dredging 
project so that the port could accommodate larger vessels. 
Indeed, port adaptation measures can be a non-trivial investment of 
resources, and studies suggest that assessment of resilience strategies can 
benefit by understanding the needs of a wide range of stakeholders (Moser 
and Ekstrom 2010). One study, focused on coastal seaports, found that port 
operators, port tenants, and representatives from the public policy sector, 
academia, and community groups had a role to play in climate change 
adaptation (Becker et al. 2013a). Further, because natural disasters at ports 
can affect stakeholders directly and indirectly (Becker et al. 2014), a range 
of perceptions provides current (or historical) locally relevant data. Also, 
stakeholder’s engagement and participation can lead to more effective 
adaptation (Wilbanks and Kates 1999; Eakin and Luers 2006). 
For a coastal infrastructure, the ways in which these can adapt to the 
imminent risks of climate and extreme weather events are by protecting 
their infrastructure, by elevating their piers and facilities, by designing for 
submersion, or by abandoning the infrastructure (Becker et al. 2013) 
(Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Four levels of port adaptation strategies: Protect, Elevate, Design for 
Submersion, and Abandon (Images: Protect, photo by www.dutchwatersector.com; 
Elevate, author unknown; Design for Submersion, Alabama State Port Authority; 
Abandon, Dan Cuellar 2012.) 
 
At the policy level, to advance the adaptation of ports, policies could 
include the development of vulnerability assessment plans or 
incorporating resilience goals into the standard operations and 
management programs. Some ports could benefit from the acquisition of 
adjacent lands and properties or the acquisition of insurance coverage 
(Becker and Caldwell 2015). Becker and Caldwell (2015) found port 
stakeholder’s strategies for resilience clustered into seven categories: 
• Building codes and land use regulations 
• Long-range planning 
• Construction and design strategies (on and off port lands)  
• Private sector and insurance policies 
• Emergency preparations, response, and recovery  
• Research  
• Networks and new ways of thinking. 
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Ongoing, “todays needs and options” to address adaptation and resilience 
efforts “will depend on investments and decisions made in the past” 
(Crabbé and Robin 2006; Hallegatte 2009).  
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2 Research Objectives  
This study collected data from 30 port decision-makers, representing 15 
ports, on their perceptions of the barriers to climate and extreme weather 
adaptation and the strategies to help them overcome these barriers. It 
used a grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Charmaz 
2006) to develop the categorical classification for port-specific typology of 
adaptation barriers. This research also used a CCM (Caulkins and Hyatt 
1999; Romney et al. 1987) to assess port decision-makers’ level of 
agreement on climate and extreme weather impacts in the North Atlantic. 
It identified barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptation and 
assessed concepts of vulnerability as perceived by port decision-makers. 
Further, it defined knowledge and perception trends and gaps that local 
port authorities and policy makers can use to help in resilience planning 
and in developing extreme weather adaptation strategies for their ports. 
The two main goals of this research are the following: 
• Understand how port decision-makers perceive barriers to climate and 
extreme weather adaptation in the North Atlantic and how these 
perceptions relate to those identified in other studies on this topic  
• Highlight decision-makers’ perceptions of strategies that can help in 
overcoming these barriers 
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3 Research Activities and Methods  
To assess port-specific barriers to adaptation to climate and extreme 
weather for the 15 ports within the CENAD, this project used a combined 
qualitative and quantitative approach to collect data: 
1. Review literature on types and classification of barriers to climate and 
extreme weather adaptations. 
2. Interview port decision-makers on their perceptions of the barriers1 to 
adaptation and the strategies to address these. 
3. Use a grounded theory approach to develop a typology of barriers to 
adaptation, and cluster barriers into categories. 
4. Implement a CCM to measure consensus on barriers to adaptation. 
In addition to describing a typology of barriers based on the decision-
makers’ responses and listing their responses on strategies to address 
these, this study considered how different decision-maker groups 
(directors/managers, environmental specialists, safety planners) perceive 
barriers differently.  
3.1 Study location 
This research uses 15 of the 22 medium-use and high-use ports (McIntosh 
et al. 2019) ports within the U.S.Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) North 
Atlantic Division2 (CENAD), consistent with the sample population 
utilized for developing extreme weather and climate vulnerability 
indicators by McIntosh et al. (2019, Figure 2). The U.S. Army Engineer 
Research and Development Center is interested in piloting port resilience 
and vulnerability assessment methods with high-use ports3. By adding 
medium-use ports and restricting the selection to the North Atlantic 
                                                                
1 Before the interviews, the interview protocol and procedures were approved by the Institute of Review 
Board (IRB) at the University of Rhode Island (IRB Approved 894694-8). This standard protocol 
required that interviewees be informed of the purpose of the study and that they give a written or oral 
consent to being interviewed and being recorded (for transcription purposes only). The majority of 
interviews (73%, 22/30) were conducted in person, 27% were conducted over the phone, 10 of the 
ports were visited. 
2 The North Atlantic Division is one of nine USACE divisions and encompasses the U.S. Eastern Seaboard 
from Virginia to Maine USACE. 2014. USACE Civil Works Division Boundaries. 
http://geoplatform.usace.army.mil/home/item.html?id=c3695249909c45a2b2e2c3993aff3edb. U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers. 
3 Dr. Julie Rosati, U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center, Coastal and Hydraulics 
Laboratory, Personal communication, February 2015. 
ERDC/CHL CR-19-?? 13 
region, researchers could create a manageable sample of 22 ports. The 
proximity of these ports to the University of Rhode Island allowed for site 
visits and interviews. 
Figure 2. The 22 medium-use (blue dots) and high-use (magenta dots)  
ports in the North Atlantic per 2015 USACE CENAD data. 
 
3.2 Study participants  
Many climate adaptation studies focus on stakeholders — those who can 
affect or be affected by achievement of an organization’s objectives 
(Freeman 1984). This study focuses on three types of stakeholders who 
have expertise and decision-making roles within the port: port 
directors/managers, safety planners, and environmental specialists. The 
responsibilities of each group are listed in Table 1.  
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Directors or managers 
Common titles 
 - executive director  
 - director of operations 
 - project manager 
 
17 • Run port operations and systems 
(short- or long-term) 
• Perform maintenance of vessels 
and facilities 
• Supervise employees 
• Manage specific functions of port 
facilities 
• Plan efficient use of port resources, 
with attention to security, safety, 
and health of personnel 
Environmental specialists 
Common titles: 
 - marine environment  
 and civil engineering consultant 
 - manager of strategic planning  
 - harbor master  
 - environmental manager 
 - project manager - climate 
mitigation and resilience 
manager 
8 • Monitor related environmental 
regulations 
• Oversee environmental protection 




 - vice president of sustainability 
(consultant) 
 - chief harbor  
 safety strategist and  
 operations assistant 
5 • Monitor and assess hazardous and 
unsafe situations  
• Develop guidelines for personnel 
safety 
Interviewees mentioned their close collaborations with regional or state 
harbor masters and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) in preparing for natural 
hazard events or during emergency responses. In some cases, harbor 
masters are responsible for the safety planning of coastal infrastructure in 
a region. The position of the environmental specialist can often times be 
outsourced to private consultants. However, this study was limited to 
employees of the ports themselves. 
Port directors/managers rely on communications with the environmental 
specialists, safety planners, or harbor masters and the USCG to stay 
informed on natural hazards and other climate and extreme weather 
events. Different ports — depending on who the decision-maker(s) 
communicate(s) with and the port director’s/manager’s prior experience 
with hazards — may respond differently to the same event. (When 
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presenting results, references attributed to directors correspond to the 
directors/managers decision-maker type.) 
Management and governance also vary across the ports. Those without a 
port authority are privately owned or managed by a private entity in the 
name of the state (Table 2). Also, the number of decision-makers and their 
years’ experience can influence a port’s response. These data are also 
included in Table 2. 
Table 2. Demographics representing participating decision-makers. 
Number of participating ports 15/22 
Ports with port authority 9/15 
Number of interviews 30 
Types of decision-makers  
Directors and managers 17 
Safety planners 8 
Environmental specialists 5 
  
Years of experience 
<5 7 
5 - 10 7 
11 - 20 8 
> 20 8 
Range of experience 1 - 46 (years) 
Gender of decision-makers 
Female 8/30 
Male 22/30 
This study is exploratory; researchers were challenged to find willing 
respondents to represent the three categories of port directors, 
environmental specialists, and safety planners from 15 of the 22 of the 
medium- and high-use ports in the North Atlantic. Some port directors 
are charged with multiple functions and do not have staff with these 
specific titles.  
3.3 Development of interview instrument: Semi-structured 
interviews 
The research team developed open-ended questions to capture the 
perceptions of decision-makers in 22 medium- and high-use ports in the 
North Atlantic on barriers to adaptation and response strategies. 
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Additional questions explored the concept of vulnerability — to determine 
if interviewees understood the components of vulnerability (exposure, 
sensitivity, and adaptive capacity (McIntosh et al. 2019).  
By coding the responses to these interviews, consensus on the perceived 
barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptation and recorded 
decision-makers’ knowledge of strategies to respond were quantified. 
Additionally, the practices and circumstances that are locally relevant 
across the studied ports and the variation in the responses across the 
different decision-makers can be further analyzed and determined. The 
methodology and insights from this study can be applied to other 
areas/categories. The results and recommendations from this study can 
help address adaptation barriers so that seaports can respond to climate 
and extreme weather events. 
This study addresses the need to quantify barriers first — as a precursor to 
drafting a strategic plan and recommendations to increase the port and the 
port community’s ability to adapt to coastal hazards. 
3.4 Overview of data collection  
The data were collected over 4 months (November 2017 — February 2018). 
Decision-makers were identified using the ports’ websites and direct 
phone calls. The identified decision-makers received information on the 
study, its goals and benefits (Appendix B), and a one-page project 
summary description (Appendix C) via email. Electronic communications 
were followed up with phone calls.  
During the data collection period, 30 port decision-makers from 15 of the 
22 ports were interviewed: 22 in person and 8 over the phone. 
Respondents answered questions about the barriers to adaptation (e.g., 
“What are some of the challenges to implementing extreme weather 
adaptation actions at your port?”) and about the resources or strategies to 
help them overcome these (e.g., “What resources would enable you to 
overcome these challenges?”) (Appendix D). 
3.5 Data analysis methods 
3.5.1 Coding of transcripts 
A grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 2017; Charmaz 2006) approach to 
identifying port barriers to climate and extreme weather events is an 
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iterative process that allows for views and concepts to emerge and be 
grouped into unique themes or categories. After the transcription of the 
interviews, researchers coded the transcripts line-by-line. These were first 
coded for barriers, then for strategies, using the NVivo qualitative data 
analysis software package (NVivo 2014) . Reviewing the transcripts1, 
researchers identified and classified barriers and strategies for overcoming 
the barriers independently and resolved differences where necessary2 
following the process laid out by Ekstrom and Moser (2014):  
1. Each coder reviews interview transcripts and independently identifies 
the following: 
a. barriers to adaptation mentioned by respondents 
b. strategies mentioned by the decision-makers to overcome them.  
2. Each coder develops a classification for each observation. 
3. Coders compare the classifications and reconciles where necessary 
before coding all the interview transcripts and tallying codes. (This step 
adds rigor to the study). Main nodes and secondary nodes for coding 
(1) barriers and (2) strategies for overcoming the barriers were 
predetermined. 
4. Discuss details regarding differences or similarities for the barriers 
mentioned across the three categories of decision-makers to answer if 
the barriers are seen differently. 
5. Frequency is a measure of the number of times that a unique, clearly 
distinguishable barrier is mentioned. It is an indicator of the diversity 
of unique barriers within a larger class of barriers. 
6. Regardless of how often the barrier was mentioned, frequency should 
not be interpreted as a direct indication of importance and cannot 
reveal how difficult it is to overcome a barrier. 
7. Barriers and strategies will be coded and grouped by decision-maker 
type (managers/directors, safety planners, environmental specialist) 
for further analysis. 
                                                                
1 Before the interviews, the interview protocol and procedures were approved by the University of 
California-Berkeley Human Subjects Committee. The protocol required that interviewees be informed of 
the purpose of the study and give written consent to being interviewed and being taped (for 
transcription purposes only). Almost all interviews (98 percent) were conducted in person, either at the 
informant’s office or in a mutually agreeable location. The remainder was undertaken by phone due to 
scheduling constraints or the preference of the interviewee. IRB Approved 894694-8 
2 NVivo Coding comparison between coders; in the initial coding phase, yielded a 0.696 Kappa value 
(values between 0.40 - 0.75 = fair to good agreement). 
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3.5.2 Organization of results 
The output of the cultural consensus model is presented first. Next are the 
identified seven major categories of identified barriers to adaptation 
(Figure 3). Each barrier is described and explained, and its sub-categories 
are presented and exemplified within the context of the decision-makers’ 
responses. Next, the strategies to overcome the barriers to adaptation are 
presented. These clustered into five major categories of strategies. Each 
strategy is described, and its corresponding sub-categories are explained, 
with examples from port decision-makers.  
3.5.3 Use of Cultural Consensus Model (CCM) 
The CCM assumes there is a shared cultural knowledge or a cultural 
normative belief in a group. The use of the CCM guides the aggregation of 
individual “culturally correct responses” and measures the level of 
agreement between individuals (Weller 2007; Romney et al. 1987). A 
Pearson correlation coefficient measures the agreement to analyze the 
number of subjects and their frequencies. 
The use of the CCM guides the aggregation of individual responses to a 
series of questions to an estimate of “cultural correct responses,” 
measuring the level of competence between individuals as well (Weller 
2007). The CCM distinguishes patterns of socially transmitted knowledge 
people use to interpret the world to make decisions (Romney et al. 1987). 
This can be useful in decision-making for climate and extreme weather 
resilience investments. 
For example, in a study on “cultural cognition of risk” that looks at climate 
change and the use of nuclear energy, researchers identified where 
members of the public disagreed on scientific facts surrounding risk 
(Kahan et al. 2011). Others have used it to analyze levels of competence 
among a group of people (Boster 1989).  
The CCM is useful in assessing qualitative data that can be organized into 
categories. Researchers can use it to identify barriers and make recom-
mendations for locally relevant constructive interventions to the extreme 
weather adaptation process.  
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4 Results and Discussion 
In the beginning of this research, two main questions were posed: “What 
are some of the challenges to implement extreme weather adaptation?” 
and “What resources [or strategies] would enable you to overcome these 
challenges?” After interviewing 30 port decision-makers at 15 different 
ports in the North Atlantic region, the responses to these questions 
resulted in seven major barriers and five major strategies. The frequency 
of responses from each decision-makers group for each category of 
barriers and strategies is identified in Figures 3 and 5. A total of 17 port 
directors, 8 environmental specialists and 5 safety planners participated. 
Example quotations and references from the interviews are presented for 
the barriers and for the strategies to overcome the barriers1. This section 
presents the results of the CCM and then explains each identified barrier 
and the context in which it is mentioned (sub-categories). 
4.1 A CCM to identify decision-makers’ adaptation barriers 
First, respondents’ responses were coded to identify the major barriers as 
perceived by respondents. With barriers identified, the CCM analysis was 
used with ANTHROPAC 6.46 software (Borgatti 1996) to assess agreement 
between different respondents. The CCM measures the ratio of the 
variability in the data in the first to second factor loading2 (>3.0). From 
the CCM, the respondents’ consensus measures (Table 2) and estimates of 
their competence or agreement with the group were derived (Appendix F). 
This analysis allows the identification of how subgroups (i.e., port 
directors, environmental specialists, safety planners) have common 
perceptions around barriers. 
With a factor ratio of 3 (i.e., rounding of 2.91), the respondents are said to 
be drawn from a single population, meaning that there is agreement in 
their responses on the barriers to adaptation. A smaller factor ratio would 
indicate that respondents pertain to two or more populations — meaning 
                                                                
1 Some quotations from the interviews have been lightly edited and condensed for clarity purposes. 
Verbatim quotations are on file with the researchers. 
2 The factor loadings are based on the common variance between the analyzed responses. Each 
decision-maker’s response is compared to the responses from all the decision-makers (n = 30). This 
process generates a correlation matrix where each column of squared loading factors (e.g., 
eigenvalues) represents the amount of variance accounted for by a factor {NCSU 2018}. Therefore, 
factor loading one accounts for the variability in the data, and each succeeding factor loading accounts 
for as much of the remaining variability. 
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that their views (on climate and extreme weather) are not homogeneous — 
having different perceptions of what the barriers to adaptations are. The 
competence score represents a measure of their shared knowledge. For the 
studied group, the average competence score is 0.598, and the values 
range from 0.981 (highest agreement) to 0.067 (low or absence of 
agreement) (Table 3). As an example, when two respondents answered 
that barrier #1 and barrier #2 were the main challenges, their competence 
score could be closer to 1, or 0.981. However, when a third respondent 
mentioned barrier #3 to be most important, its competence score could be 
closer to 0.598. The full output of the competence model is presented in 
Appendix F. 
Table 3. CCM analysis: consensus for 30 port decision-makers on the perceived barriers to 
climate and extreme weather adaptation. Factor loading one accounts for the variability in the 






1st to 2nd 
Factor Ratio  Average "Competency" 
Sample (n = 30) 14.282 4.905 2.912  
0.598 
 (St. Dev. 0.25) 
By measuring consensus in decision-makers’ responses to the barriers to 
adaptation, it is possible to identify the knowledge people use to interpret 
the world when making decisions (Romney et al. 1987). Climate change 
studies stress how decision-making barriers can slow the development and 
implementation of adaptation strategies (Moser and Ekstrom 2010; 
Biesbroek et al. 2011). The measurements of the cultural consensus model 
provide a signal of the high level of agreement shared by port decision-
makers — an agreement that could facilitate conversations and 
collaborations to build port resilience in the North Atlantic region. The 
strength of the results on the barriers comes from having found consensus 
among the respondents (Table 3, Figure 3). These results can guide plans 
and strategies to overcome the barriers. 
4.2 Typology of port barriers to adaptation  
This analysis revealed seven major categories of perceived barriers to 
climate and extreme weather adaptation, as perceived by 30 port 
decision-makers in 15 of the 22 medium- and high-use ports in the 
North Atlantic. Figure 3 shows the number of respondents that 
mentioned at least one barrier from each of the seven categories at least 
one time during the interview.  
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Figure 3. Seven barriers to climate and extreme weather adaptations resulted from 30 
interviews in 15 North Atlantic ports. The value above each color is the percentage of 
respondents who mentioned that barrier within the decision-maker type (Directors/Managers, 
Environmental Specialists, Safety Planners). Blue numbers are the total frequency of the 
responses (n = 30). Blue-outlined sections are the overall percentage of responses for a 
barrier (Graph credit: J. Menendez Lopez). 
 
The following section describes the seven categories of barriers. Each has 
sub-categories, setting the context in which the barrier was mentioned. 
For example, the category lack of understanding of risks has six sub-
categories. One is confusion over the level of risk, and another is the 
difficulty of predicting where impacts will be. Under the sub-category 
responses by decision-maker type, some distinct responses and 
differences in viewpoints of given groups were highlighted. In parenthesis 
the coded number and type for the respondent are noted, as follows: DIR 
= port director, ES = Environmental specialist, SP = Safety planner. The 
number following the respondent type is the participant’s number; thus, 
DIR18 is a port director coded as #18. When decision-makers’ responses 
to barriers differed, specific examples are provided. 
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4.2.1 Barrier 1 – Lack of understanding of risks 
4.2.1.1 Description of Barrier 1 
The lack of understanding of risks was mentioned by 28/30 respondents 
(Figure 3). This is further explained by the barrier’s sub-categories 
(Table 4) which include (1) Confusion over the level of risk, (2) Difficulty 
of predicting where the impact will be, (3) Lack of awareness of risk, (4) 
Lack of experience with extreme events, (5) Political discord, and (6) Lack 
of understanding of unintended consequences. This is a barrier that 
typically arises at the beginning of a planning process (Moser and Ekstrom 
2010). Understanding that adaptation is a process is key to having rational 
decision-making that accounts for understanding the problem, planning 
adaptation actions, as well as managing the implementation of their 
strategic options (Moser and Ekstrom 2010). 
Within the IPCC, addressing uncertainty for decision-makers has surfaced 
as an important topic. Social scientists look at adaptation barriers 
regarding people’s willingness to act, or their motives and willingness to 
act, in the context of decision-making processes (Tompkins et al. 2010; 
Biesbroek et al. 2011). These studies find that social factors like attitudes, 
values, and ethical beliefs explain how individuals chose to engage in the 
adaptation process. Therefore, these social factors present a constraint 
that defines people’s adaptive behavior (Biesbroek et al. 2011).  
In Table 4, the levels of agreement between the decision-maker categories 
are color-coded to denote high agreement to low agreement, as found by 
the CCM. 
 
While a higher number of port directors identified lack of 
understanding and governance disconnect in their responses 
about barriers, environmental specialists mentioned physical 
constraints of the ports second to the lack of understanding. For 
the safety planners — those who deal with port safety daily — 
mentioned the lack of funding as frequently as the risks do not 
meet an action threshold as their top-two barriers (Figure 3). 
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Table 4. Lack of understanding of risks, and its six sub-categories. Numbers in the rows are 
percentages of the total number (n = 30) of the respondents in each decision-maker group 
that mentioned a strategy in the category at least one time. Colors denote high agreement 
(green), to low agreement (orange), to zero mentions (gray). 








  n = 17 n = 8 n = 5 
Confusion over the level of risk 18 25 20 
Difficulty of predicting where the impact will be 35 63 60 
Lack of awareness of risk 29 38 20 
Lack of experience with extreme events 59 38 60 
Political discord   20 
Lack of understanding of unintended 
consequences 47 63 40 
 
   
Most sub-category barriers relate to the difficulty in predicting impacts or 
if the hazard will occur (Table 4). Many decision-makers felt that severe 
weather events in the past (if any) did not predict the future, “. . . The 
storm was over 50miles/hours gusts, but we typically dont see a whole lot  
of these [level of the storm], and there certainly could be a lot of damage to 
the buildings and all the structures . . .” (DIR18)  
The respondents also mentioned the difficulty of predicting where the 
flooding will be. What is expected to happen may not happen, and what 
does happen may demand a different response. In the words of one 
decision-maker: “. . . the flooding was coming from the other way . . . it 
was coming from a direction people were not expecting it . . .” (ES29)  
Respondents described resilience planning as often reactionary and 
myopic, with ports engaging in mitigation planning only after a natural 
hazard and then preparing to respond to similar hazards in the future 
based on the latest experience, rather than to the other plausible events. 
As one decision-maker said, “I think that we have done enough . . . to 
measure ourselves up against the next Hurricane Sandy . . . But 
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unfortunately, the reality is Sandy was not nearly as bad as it could have 
been.” (DIR23) 
Environmental specialists emphasized the need to conduct regular risk 
assessments. One said, “Even if our terminals are resilient, getting goods 
and services off the terminal and over the transportation network might 
pose challenges if . . . networks are not adequately resilient.” (ES10) 
Unintended consequences are defined as post-hazards effects that were 
not anticipated. One safety expert’s statement reflected what others had 
similarly expressed, “. . . because we got hit with flooding and surge, we . . . 
react to flooding and surge . . . there is not really a focus on the other 
hazards we are facing.” (SP21) 
4.2.1.2 Responses by decision-maker type 
Of the five safety planners, four mentioned this barrier. They were the only 
ones to cite the lack of understanding of risk in the context of political 
discord (Table 4). In the minds of these individuals, the priorities among 
politicians are narrow and not necessarily in alignment with climate 
adaptation. As one safety officer explained it, “Because of the politics, 
actions tend to be a little myopic.” (SP21)  
Although advances in science and new scientific models can assist 
decision-makers in the understanding of complex problems, the ambiguity 
and inherent uncertainty of long-term climate change impacts challenges 
the short-term dynamics of the politics in decision-making (Biesbroek et 
al. 2013). Respondents in this study felt the difficulty of predicting what 
impacts will take place or if a hazard will occur in the future. For them, 
better scientific models for predictions of natural hazards are needed to 
better understand the inherent uncertainties of climate. In some cases, 
respondents cannot recall when the last natural hazard affected them 
(Moser and Ekstrom 2010), reducing the urgency to understand and plan 
for long-term extreme weather impacts. Hence, understanding the 
differences between the long-term impacts of climate change and the 
short-term (societal) dynamics makes adaptation planning even more 
difficult (Biesbroek et al. 2013).  
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4.2.2 Barrier 2 – Lack of funding  
4.2.2.1 Description of Barrier 2 
Lack of funding was mentioned by 23/30 respondents (Table 5). This 
barrier is defined as the absence of financial resources or the absence of 
trained human resources to implement the needed adaptations. There are 
three sub-categories within this barrier: (1) Cost of adaptation, (2) 
Environmental regulations increase costs, and (3) Lack of funding (in 
general terms1) (Table 5). Lack of funding is a dominant obstacle. 
Presently, increasing the robustness of infrastructure to withstand more 
frequent extreme events is often delayed due to the lack of financial 
resources (Eisenack et al. 2014). 
Table 5. Lack of funding and its three sub-categories. Numbers in the rows are percentages of 
the total number (n = 30) of the respondents in each decision-maker group that mentioned a 
strategy in the category at least one time. Colors denote high agreement (green), to low 
agreement (orange), to zero mentions (gray). 







 n = 17 n = 8 n = 5 
Cost of adaptation 24 38 60 
Environmental regulations increase costs 6   
Lack of funding (in general terms) 59 50 100 
Port facilities across the United States have old, aging infrastructures that 
need ongoing maintenance. Maintenance can be seen as an opportunity to 
make improvements that integrate resilience to climate and extreme 
weather considerations. However, planning for smarter, long-term 
investments in resilience adds to the costs of adaptations. 
One director said, “We inherited some old facilities at the port. We are . . . 
rehabilitating our main pier . . . built in 1956 . . . [and] beginning to 
deteriorate . . .” But, as the words of another director made clear, the 
barrier to adaptation “. . . comes down to money.” (DIR25)  
                                                                
1 Sub-categories that include ‘in general terms’ are designated to cluster responses that did not fit in the 
other named sub-categories. This was done to avoid creating many distinct sub-categories with only 
one sample reference. 
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This barrier also related to the need for a change in the [port] agency’s 
culture as well as the time investment to plan ahead. Too often, ports “. . . 
do not have a planning staff that deals with environmental issues.” (DIR7) 
Decision-makers talked about this barrier as it relates to municipal 
government’s limited funds and the complexity of retrofitting a port. 
Often, state projects do not meet requirements for federal support, which 
may favor regional or interstate projects. As one director explained, “If I 
were going to build a new bridge that connects two states, that would get 
money. If I am looking to elevate a bridge in my state, that probably would 
not . . .” (DIR5). This is all the while “. . . municipal governments [funding] 
have been trimmed down to the bottom.” (ES30) 
This barrier was of concern in the context of the need and cost of 
adaptation versus the need for and cost of regular maintenance as “. . . to 
implement adaptations, everything is very expensive . . . over a million 
dollars.” (SP21) 
For old ports and their infrastructure, there is the additional challenge of 
keeping up with today’s larger ships and their ability to respond timely to 
an imminent weather event. Safety officers explained that while ships are 
getting bigger, many old ports’ waterways are narrow. In a significant 
weather event, the captain of the port or the USCG may direct the port’s 
ships out to sea, but because of the narrow turning basin, “. . . we [captains 
of some large ships] may not be able to follow those directions.” (SP16) 
4.2.2.2  Responses by decision-maker type 
Lack of funding was the second barrier most mentioned by the decision-
makers — 13 directors, 5 environmental specialists, and 5 safety officers. 
In Table 5, the levels of agreement are represented by their percentages; 
these are the number of mentions per decision-maker category.  
Regarding the lack of funding barrier, directors were clear in their 
concerns about other sectors that rely on ports and waterways and that are 
already challenged by limited funding, “. . . the commercial fishing 
industry, with all the regulatory problems that they have, cant bear the 
financial burden.” (DIR14) 
Respondents spoke of how environmental regulation such as compliance 
with the American Disabilities Act (ADA) can increase the costs of the 
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needed adaptation, which “is extremely challenging [when space is 
limited].” (DIR5) 
In this category of barriers, one environmental specialist mentioned the 
port’s electrical components’ exposure to climate and extreme weather 
events. This included the reference to newer technology not performing 
under extreme weather conditions. One environmental specialist noted the 
concern that “electrical substations are very low and not elevated 
sufficiently . . . they could be elevated, but it is a huge expense.” (ES30) 
In other studies, the lack of funding is explained in the context of a 
governance void (Hajer 2003), the absence of leadership (Kretsch 2016; 
Becker and Kretsch 2019)1, and/or lack of will to invest (Barnett et al. 
2013). However, ports need to keep their competitive edge — looking into 
the future, the investments of today depended on the investments of the 
past (Pechan 2014; Hallegatte 2009; Crabbé and Robin 2006). Port 
decision-makers need to understand that financial constraints can become 
more of a burden over time as they address shortages in budgets and other 
priorities (Ekstrom and Moser 2014). 
4.2.3 Barrier 3 – Perceived risks do not exceed an action threshold 
4.2.3.1  Description of Barrier 3 
Perceived risks do not exceed an action threshold was mentioned as a 
barrier by 21/30 respondents (Figure 3). Here, there is an awareness that a 
risk exists, but the risk has not exceeded a magnitude or intensity to 
prompt an action. These results are in agreement with Barnett et al. (2013) 
and link to lack of understanding (barrier #1) as it relates to absence of 
will to invest in the unknown (Barnett et al. 2013). These responses not 
only highlight the importance of having information to better understand 
the risks — prior to an investment but also the importance of having an 
informed governance.  
This barrier is related to barrier two (a lack of understanding of the risks). 
Even when the risks are known, mitigating for them is not necessarily a 
priority. There were eight sub-categories in this perceived barrier (Table 
6): (1) Perceived risks do not exceed action threshold (in general terms), 
                                                                
1 Becker, A. 2014. Port Cities Preparing for Changing Oceans. Presentation delivered to the Consortium 
for Ocean Leadership Council -- Public Forum on the Urban Ocean. Washington, DC. 
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(2) Agency culture is not forward thinking, (3) Climate denialism, (4) 
Conflicting priorities (e.g., going green versus resilience), (5) Lack of will 
to invest in the unknown, (6) Planning for future climate not necessary at 
present, (7) Resilience improvements impact business continuity, and (8) 
Resilience investments are not a priority. 
This barrier was mentioned in the context of ports being unwilling to 
invest in the unknown. In the words of one environmental specialist, “It is 
a cost-benefit risk management decision to say how much are you willing 
to spend for an event that may — or may not ever — take place . . .” (ES22) 
Another spoke of the impact on work stream and revenue flow: “. . . it is 
hard to, say, raise a terminal by two feet without completely disrupting the 
flood of commerce over those terminals.” (ES10) 
The sub-category perceived risks do not exceed an action threshold speaks 
to the challenge of disruptions and how planning future reconstruction 
projects could affect the ability to keep up with operations, given a port 
operating at near capacity. Respondents who mentioned this barrier 
emphasized that the mission of terminals is to serve their customers, 
which means, “. . . get more product in and get it out of the gate.” When 
“ports are locally own and operated, they do not [always] have the big 
global picture.” (DIR7) 
Although respondents indicated that there is a need for adaptation to 
natural hazard events, they suggested that priority still is given to other 
more immediate tasks related to standard operations, maintenance, and 
replacement of equipment. One director explained, “Taking the time and 
energy to create planning and think that far ahead . . . is a use of resources. 
That is time that could be spent doing something else like addressing 
paving concerns, or . . . working to improve labor circumstances or 
maintaining equipment.” (DIR17) 
4.2.3.2  Responses by decision-maker type 
Thirteen directors, three environmental specialists, and five safety 
planners mentioned Perceived risks do not exceed an action threshold as a 
barrier. In Table 6, the levels of agreement are represented by their 
percentages; these are the number of mentions per decision-maker sub-
category.  
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Table 6. Perceived risks do not exceed an action threshold, and its eight sub-categories. 
Numbers in the rows are percentages of the total number (n = 30) of the respondents in each 
decision-maker group that mentioned a strategy in the category at least one time. The colors 
denote high agreement (green), to low agreement (orange), to zero mentions (gray). 









 n = 17 n = 8 n = 5 
Perceived risks do not exceed an action 
threshold (in general terms) 12 13 20 
Agency culture not forward thinking 6  40 
Climate denialism 6  40 
Conflicting priorities (going green vs resilience) 6 13  
Lack of will to invest in the unknown 6 13 40 
Planning for future climate not necessary at 
present 29   
Resilience improvements impact business 
continuity 18 13  
Resilience investments are not a priority 35  60 
All safety planners felt this was a barrier (almost double the response 
percentage of the other two groups of decision-makers). Safety planners 
mentioned it in the context of decision-makers lacking the will to invest in 
the unknown and in the difficulty of predicting the future). Such 
investment is especially difficult for ports that have little or no experience 
with severe storms or flooding events. “We need to change the culture and 
start to think . . . forward . . . get in the right mindset of ‘this is . . . real’ . . . 
we need to face it.” (SP21) 
Another safety expert explained the dilemma of requesting $100,000 to 
raise his port’s substation because of SLR, being asked to justify that 
expenditure, and getting the response, “Why would I spend money on 
something that is predicted versus something that I know that right now 
needs to be done?” (SP13) 
Environmental specialists mentioned the conflict between green 
investments and adaptation investments: 
“There are consequences of going green. A number of the 
terminals, particularly with their equipment, have moved from 
diesel equipment to electric equipment. So now, all the sudden 
you got electric motors that are inundated with water . . . in the 
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past, if they were diesel or motor engines the impact would have 
not been as great. Going green has had an impact on your 
resiliency to stormwater damage.” (ES22) 
Directors and safety officers perceive that agency culture is not forward 
thinking; some of their ideas align with climate denialism: “I am not 
convinced that there is climate change” (DIR14), or in mentioning that the 
science is not solid and that there are too many contradictions, in the 
opinion of a safety planner, “You know, weather fluctuates! I am trained to 
look at facts and in some cases statistics and evidence.” (SAF16) 
4.2.4 Barrier 4 – Physical constraints limit adaptation options  
4.2.4.1  Description of Barrier 4 
Twenty of 30 respondents mentioned physical constraints limit options as 
a barrier (Figure 3). This is a location-specific factor or a 
physical/geographical-specific characteristic that limits the options for the 
port’s infrastructure adaptation. There were four sub-categories of this 
barrier (Table 7): (1) The complexity of refitting for resilience, (2) Existing 
facilities under-designed for present and future conditions, (3) Lack of 
practical solutions, and (4) Port is restricted to its current location (it 
cannot move). 
Most decision-makers are aware that the growth and development of 
ports, parallel to coastal development, and the expansion of other sectors 
reduce the area that would be needed for climate and extreme weather 
adaptations. Aging of the infrastructure, geophysical changes of the coastal 
landscapes, and other regulation conditions add to the complexity of this 
barrier. These facilities are presently under designed for present day and 
future conditions. Other studies explain this physical barrier noting that 
because of their placement and their geographical location, ports are 
constrained (Adger et al. 2009).  
One director said, “We inherited old facilities. The port was built in 1956, 
the pier is beginning to deteriorate on the outer shore side . . .” causing 
sinkholes on the deck. (DIR1). 
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Table 7. Physical constraints limits options and its four sub-categories. Numbers in the rows 
are percentages of the total number (n = 30) of the respondents in each decision-maker 
group that mentioned a strategy in the category at least one time. Colors denote high 
agreement (green), to low agreement (orange), to zero mentions (gray). 








 n = 17 n = 8 n = 5 
Complexity of refitting for resilience 24 50  
Existing facilities under-designed for 
present and future conditions 77 25 20 
Lack of practical solutions 18 25 20 
Port is restricted to its current location (it 
can't move) 29 13  
Another, referring specifically to container terminals, explained, “. . . any 
study is going to [say] that in order to raise the berths, you . . . have to have 
an additional strengthening of the structure itself . . .” (ES22). Another 
said, “A lot of the infrastructure drainage and so forth . . . wasnt really 
originally designed to accommodate what we are seeing and what we will 
see in the future.” (ES29) 
Respondents also offered reasons why expansion into other nearby areas 
often is not possible — simply because of how a coastline is developed. One 
director explained that you might think it easy to identify areas along 
those rivers, clear them, and make them available for water to flow, but he 
said, “Unfortunately, they are all commercially occupied now.” (DIR7) 
Retrofitting for resilience becomes even more complex when coupled with 
ADA and other regulations. One director said, “How can we do port 
adaptation planning and remain compliant with ADA as well? Because of 
the transition, the free-board between the vessel and the dock, you have to 
accommodate a 20-foot transition for ADA: that is extremely challenging” 
(DIR5). Another respondent mentioned the inability to address 
navigational hazards such as an old, decommissioned bridge in a New 
England waterway for which there was no money for deconstruction 
(Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Without funding for deconstruction, a decommissioned bridge becomes a 
navigational hazard. (Google Earth image). 
 
4.2.4.2  Responses by decision-maker type 
Fourteen directors, four environmental specialists, and two safety 
planners mentioned that their port’s physical constraints limit options as a 
barrier to adaptation (Figure 3).  
The directors and the environmental specialists explained this barrier in 
similar terms (Table 7). Refitting ports is a challenge and an opportunity. 
It is complex and difficult because of the extensive yard areas that would 
need to be elevated and the need for continuous investment. One 
environmental specialist noted, “. . . every time you invest, it is an 
opportunity to give it [the port/port infrastructure] more lifespan.” 
(ES30). “The port could be elevated as we rebuild . . . [but] there is a lot of 
things in a container terminal that you also have to do at the same time 
when you do that. The barrier is the physical constraints, but there are also 
opportunities.” (ES2) 
Safety planners mentioned this barrier in the context that the current 
facilities are under designed and practical solutions are lacking (Table 7). 
“Right here [around the port authority headquarters], the challenge is to 
keep the water from coming up into the side. So, if you had that wall in 
place but there is precipitation, instead of surge, now you are trapping the 
water in” (SP21). As mentioned earlier, another safety officer explained the 
difficulty of today’s large ships to turn around within the narrow space of 
some older ports’ waterways, especially amid a serious weather event. 
(SP16) 
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4.2.5 Barrier 5 – Governance disconnects 
4.2.5.1  Description of Barrier 5 
Governance disconnect was mentioned by 20/30 respondents (Figure 3). 
There are seven sub-categories within this barrier (Table 8): (1) 
Complexity of multi-entity planning, (2) Disincentives for resilience 
investment (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA]1), (3) Lack 
of clarity over who should pay for resilience, (4) Lack of clarity over who 
will maintain or control resilience infrastructure, (5) Lack of direction 
from above, (6) Political pressure, and (7) Seaports are not prioritized in 
large-scale regional planning.  
Table 8. Governance disconnect and its seven sub-categories. Numbers in the rows are 
percentages of the total number (n = 30) of the respondents in each decision-maker group 
that mentioned a strategy in the category at least one time. Colors denote high agreement 
(green), to low agreement (orange), to zero mentions (gray). 







 n = 17 n = 8 n = 5 
Complexity of multi-entity planning 47 63  
Disincentives for resilience investment (FEMA) 6 13  
Lack of clarity over who should pay for 
resilience 12 13 20 
Lack of clarity over who will maintain or control 
resilience infrastructure 35 13 20 
Lack of direction from above 29 50 20 
Political pressure 6 13 40 
Seaports are not prioritized in large scale 
regional planning 24 13 40 
Nine of the 15 participating ports in the study had a municipal or regional 
port authority. The remaining six were either privately owned or had an 
agency acting as a corporate trust on behalf of the port owners. 
Governance disconnect relates to the complexity of planning within a 
multi-entity organization. This leads to a lack of clarity on who decides on 
infrastructure resilience and who controls the investments.  
“We recognize extreme weather conditions, but most of the port is 
privately owned.” (DIR5). Another director said, “We are not a port 
                                                                
1 This challenge regards the FEMA reconstruction regulations. 
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authority, we are a corporation, so we are expected to stand on our own 
throughout. We are dependent on the state for our capital expenditures 
like [the] two new gantry cranes we just received.” (DIR24) 
Environmental specialists and safety planners agreed. “There are multiple 
terminals that operate within the port that are private.” (ES12). “Who is 
going to pay for adaptations? . . . to control it? . . . to maintain it?” (SP21) 
Directors also spoke of the challenges of being a multi-entity organization 
where facilities and terminals under the port’s authority had different 
landlords and different management frameworks. Respondents often 
described the administration of ports as being fragmented. “Long-term 
raising of the land would be extremely challenging with how fragmented 
everything is down here.” (DIR3). Another said that while having a good 
relationship with the private owners of the facility, he wasn’t always aware 
of their plans. “I am not aware of … a climate adaptation plan.” (DIR14). 
There was also mention of how governance differs port to port. In one 
director’s port, his team had little or nothing to do with terminal 
operations. “We are here basically just to help with regulatory issues and 
try to access resources for infrastructure improvements.” (DIR7) 
Collaborations with other agencies were also challenged by whatever was 
the focus and priorities of those agencies at a given time. For example, 
respondents stated that post disaster, FEMA only compensates for the 
costs of bringing the port back up to the required basic standard code. This 
gives ports little incentive to elevate their infrastructure beyond the 
minimum required, as some respondents mentioned: 
FEMA will give you a reimbursement to put a set of offices (like an 
office trailer) back where it was, and you dont have to elevate it. 
The code may require you to elevate, but FEMA doesnt necessarily 
give you any additional compensation beyond what the basic code 
requirement is. They will give you additional funding [to meet the 
basic code] if you say, ‘I want to elevate it and I have a set of 
standards that predicate that I elevate.’ (DIR23) 
From a restoration, resiliency issue, the prioritization of being able 
to get trade up and operating so that you can open the airport, you 
can open the seaports, you can get relief materials so that you can 
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get equipment in to start the cleanup—that, from a policy 
perspective, has got to change as well. (ES22) 
One environmental specialist spoke of this port’s seawall damage in a 
previous storm, and because much of the cost of the repairs were made 
with FEMA money, the new seawall “could not be rebuilt any higher or 
different than what it was when originally constructed.” (ES30) 
This barrier was often mentioned in the context of lack of direction from 
above. “I think that as the port operators, we are probably not looking to 
make those investments.” Asked if the port has a management plan that 
considers climate and extreme weather resilience, this environmental 
specialist said he was not aware of one. “We haven't been asked to develop 
one; so, I don't think that they have one specific for natural hazards.” 
(ES2) 
4.2.5.2  Responses by decision-maker type 
A total of 11 port directors, 6 environmental specialists, and 3 safety 
planners mentioned governance disconnect being a barrier (Figure 3). For 
directors, this barrier is second in ranking after the lack of understanding 
of the risk.  
In the subcategories, directors and environmental specialists saw the 
complexity of multi-entity planning as a factor. 
There is high agreement throughout most of the sub-categories. However, 
safety planners did not mention multi-entity planning or the disincentives 
of FEMA regulations as a concern. Rather, they highlighted the barrier as 
driven by political decisions, “. . . we got to play politics to get the 
finances.” (SP26), or they believed a cause was a lack of direction from 
above or the result of ports not being prioritized in large-scale regional 
planning. “We depleted that money from the Department of Defense to 
put it into different programs and now . . . we are flying 50-year-old 
planes. So, all [decision on where they will direct the money] is on who 
decides to pull the strings at any given time.” (SP16). 
Governance disconnect affects adaptation efforts at many levels. Others 
describe this disconnect in the context of institutional crowdedness and 
institutional void, or in the context of institutional fragmentation 
(Ekstrom and Moser 2014); it is also described as governance 
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fragmentation (Biesbroek 2011), and institutional governance challenges 
(Ekstrom and Moser 2014). This barrier is not singular to climate and 
extreme weather adaptation situations but present generally in all types of 
governance dealing with a complex problem (Eisenack et al. 2014).  
Decision-makers can be informed of many positive benefits and social-
economic outcomes of implementing needed adaptations, but their 
governance will still be constrained by short-term budgetary cycles (Burch 
2010) or outdated constructions standards. Respondents mentioned this 
limitation: governance disconnect arises when collaborating with other 
agencies. FEMA might favor investment on preparation, response, and 
recovery for disaster (FEMA 2015) and provide less funding for mitigation 
activities (Becker and Caldwell 2015). As an example, after experiencing a 
storm or a natural hazard, mitigation was directed towards increasing the 
port’s resilience to a similar experienced event. The port could only get 
Federal funding to rebuild to the pre-disaster standard or rebuild with 
some improvements that integrated updated SLR building codes (FEMA 
2015). However, if ports had more funding, they would opt to maximize 
the investment by building above the FEMA standards, integrating newer 
SLR projections to extend the lifetime of the investment. 
Similar to what respondents described as a lack of direction, this barrier is 
mentioned in the literature in the context of the lack of clarity of 
responsibilities for adaptation at local levels (Ekstrom and Moser 2014; 
Huitema et al. 2008; Mukheibir et al. 2013), It can be a political — because 
of costs. In some cases, an elected official will defer adaptation because of 
the high costs (Vine 2012). Furthermore, governance disconnect is linked 
to the absence of leadership and the need for timely decision-making 
routines (Burch 2010) when dealing with a system of concern (Moser and 
Ekstrom 2010)  
4.2.6 Barrier 6 – Lack of communication amongst individuals  
Lack of communication amongst individuals was mentioned by only 2/30 
respondents (Figure 3). It was mentioned by one director (6%) and one 
environmental specialist (13%). In general terms, this barrier relates to 
keeping staff and stakeholders informed of changes in climate and weather 
events, as well as adaptation strategies, to be prepared and able to sustain 
port operations. The director noted, “Communication is always the key, 
making sure that our staff is informed about our plans moving forward to 
adapt to the changing weather patterns, communicating with the captains 
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of the vessels.” (DIR1). The environmental specialist saw recent 
improvements in communications but added, “But, that [communications] 
can definitely be an issue from time to time.” (ES12) 
Biesbroek et al. (2011) also identified lack of awareness and 
communication as a barrier to climate change adaptations. Lack of 
awareness, or media misinformation, negatively influenced needed public 
and government support for climate adaptation (Biesbroek et al. 2011). As 
an example, news regarding errors in the IPCC report, in 2013, negatively 
influenced opinions surrounding climate change (Leiserowitz et al. 2013) 
generating skepticisms and mistrust. Communication, between science, 
policy, and the public, is vital to increasing general awareness about 
potential impacts of climate change (Moser 2010; Biesbroek et al. 2011). 
4.2.7 Barrier 7 – The problem is overwhelming  
The problem is overwhelming was also mentioned by only 2/30 
respondents (Figure 3): one director (6%) and one environmental 
specialist (13%). This barrier relates to the enormity of the climate change 
problem and humans’ inability to reverse course on global warming. It also 
relates to the realization that regardless how much the port prepares, it 
will always be vulnerable. “The electrical component is of concern, we have 
substations that are very low elevated. There are two major sub stations 
for this area that are below 15 feet in elevation. Now, they could be 
hardened, they could be elevated, but it is a huge expense. . . I think that 
the electrical grid is a concern” (ES30).  
… you cannot control mother nature, the severity of it. For a 
hurricane to come through, there is only so much you can do. 
You are never going to come out of it unscathed. So, obviously, 
there are challenges with all that. Although you can prepare, . . . 
you are always vulnerable at some of these extreme weather 
changes. (DIR25) 
4.3 Strategies to overcome decision-making barriers  
In addition to identifying the common barriers to decision-making as 
perceived by the port respondents, interviews also asked questions about 
how the barriers might be overcome. Analysis of interview transcripts 
shows five main strategies for helping decision-makers overcome barriers 
to adaptation: (1) Foster collaborations, (2) Make regulatory changes, (3) 
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Conduct risk assessment, (4) Develop financial incentives, and (5) Use 
new technology to enhance communication network. In Figure 5, the 
resulting frequency measures correspond to the total count that 
respondents mentioned the strategy in the interview transcript. The 
percentages are calculated for the number of responses within each 
category of decision-maker.  
Figure 5. Decision-makers’ perceptions on the strategies that can help them overcome the 
identified barriers to adaptation. The value above each color is the percentage of respondents 
that mentioned that strategy within the decision-maker category (Directors/Managers, 
Environmental Specialists, Safety Planners). Red numbers are the total frequency of the 
responses (n = 30). Red-outlined sections represents the overall percentage of responses for 
a barrier. (Graph credit: J. Menendez Lopez). 
 
4.3.1 Strategy 1 – Foster collaborations 
4.3.1.1  Description of Strategy 1 
Twenty-two of thirty respondents mentioned the foster collaborations 
strategy (Figure 5). Strategies coded in this category related to the 
promotion or encouragement of partnerships, as well as promoting public 
engagement. Six sub-categories were clustered within this strategy, as 
follows: (1) Foster collaborations (in general terms), (2) Education 
opportunities to understand risk, (3) Form public-private partnerships to 
pay for improvements, (4) Partner with academic groups to research 
adaptation, (5) Form a resilience working group, and (6) Develop risk 
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assessment or include risk and adaptation plans in port’s master plans 
(Table 9). 
 
Table 9. Foster collaborations and its six sub-categories. Numbers in the rows are 
percentages of the total number (n = 30) of the respondents in each decision-maker group 
that mentioned a strategy in the category at least one time. Colors denote high agreement 
(green), to low agreement (orange), to zero mentions (gray). 







 n = 17 n = 8 n = 5 
Foster collaborations (in general terms) 12   
Education opportunities to understand risk 18 38  
Form public-private partnerships to pay for 
improvements 41 50 40 
Partner with academic groups to research 
adaptation 41 25 20 
Form a resilience working group 12 38 40 
Developing risk assessment or include risk 
and adaptation plans in port’s master plans 24 63 40 
Social scientists have highlighted the importance of collaborations in 
promoting “strategic thinking, resourcefulness, creativity and effective 
communication” (Moser and Ekstrom 2010; page 22,030). In the context 
of responding to storms and natural hazards, many ports already 
collaborate with state emergency response and management entities, 
federal emergency management agencies, the USCG, the Department of 
Transportation, as well as the Department of Homeland Security. 
Respondents mentioned that they benefit from these collaborations and 
from accessing locally relevant information, both of which inform their 
resilience planning. “We will participate with anybody who wants to do 
anything on the climate resilience topic. We have participated with the 
Department of Homeland Security on critical infrastructures assessment, 
Most port decision-makers favored fostering collaborations as a 
strategy to remove the barriers. Through collaborations with 
academics, port decision-makers could reduce uncertainty by 
gaining knowledge of scholarly works on the range of negative 
impacts on social-environmental systems and the increasing risk 
to storm impacts in coastal areas due to climate change (USDOT 
2013; Hallegatte et al. 2013) 
ERDC/CHL CR-19-?? 40 
and I think that that helped us understand our own infrastructure better.” 
(ES30) 
Promoting education opportunities that help individuals and groups 
understand the risk and knowing how that information needs to be 
communicated—different individuals may need different information, and 
have it explained in different ways— is very important, as noted by several 
respondents: 
Creating a clearinghouse of the multiple views of climate change 
and climate resilience can be very powerful . . . some folks are 
comfortable on a planimetric view and will be able to see the 
scope and scale of the impact. Others are going to need to see it 
in sections. Not everybody has the facility to understand all 
graphic forms and some just need the information in table and 
narrative form. (ES30) 
We have a set of protocols that we developed last year after a 
flooding event . . . a rain event. With the new protocol, we do a 
better job at watching the weather, changes in the tide, then 
communicating inter-departmentally and giving notice to the 
public when we know that there is going to be an event. (ES30) 
Respondents also shared how public-private partnerships help them 
contribute to the sustainability of other sectors. 
One of the things that we are doing in our pier rehabilitation 
project, because we have an aquaculture facility just to the north 
of our pier, we are working with the owners of that aquaculture 
farm and we are probably going to relocate them—at our 
expense—to make sure that they can continue to harvest clams 
of the bay … and keep their business alive and to keep people 
working so that there is no harm to the environment, while we 
do our construction, and then we will move them back. (DIR1) 
 Having learned from experience, some respondents mentioned 
collaborations around short-term actions that sustain regular operations 
or address SLR. The short-term actions included (1) implementing best 
management practices and procedures, (2) doing pier rehabilitation, (3) 
raising the pier, (4) conducting flood mitigation projects, and (4) 
conducting assessments of critical infrastructure. With the presence of 
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port resiliency groups and the integration of their new risk assessments 
into their master plans, some respondents reported that they are making 
progress in their climate and extreme weather planning: 
The city planning department did recently [complete] a hazard 
mitigation plan. This was adopted in 2016. It is not fully 
developed yet. In this plan, they identified some of the issues 
and worked with the Public Works department, the engineer’s 
office, the water pollution control agencies. (DIR7) 
Current strategies in collaboration with the USCG focus on preparing the 
port prior to an imminent storm, as respondents mentioned: 
We got a really good maritime team in the region that is 
overseen by the USCG. They take the lead on preparations for an 
imminent storm. They have pulled all the players in and they 
have really brought an awareness, so that we are all thinking 
about being prepared all the time. (DIR14) 
I think what we are doing well now to increase the port’s 
resilience to storms is the planning, and it is the training and the 
drilling we do to ensure that boat operators understand the 
processes. With the training and mock preparations [across 
terminals, departments and port operators], [we] are also able 
to make any corrective actions. (SP6) 
4.3.1.2  Responses by decision-maker type 
There was high agreement about strategies in the category of fostering 
collaborations. A total of 23/30 respondents mentioned it (12 directors, 7 
environmental specialists, and 4 safety planners). The one difference in 
responses was on how collaborations could promote education 
opportunities to help port staff understand potential risk. This was 
mentioned by directors and environmental specialists but not by safety 
planners.  
Together with collaborative approaches, a government approach is needed 
so that adaptation efforts are facilitated and supported at the state and 
national levels (Mukheibir et al. 2013).This process would benefit 
governments being empowered, establishing better communication flow, 
and transfer of information. Studies also suggest that adaptation efforts 
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benefit from stakeholder engagement and participation (Wilbanks and 
Kates 1999; Eakin and Luers 2006). 
In the North Atlantic region, there are many examples of collaborative 
efforts (Becker and Caldwell 2015). Brown University and the University of 
Rhode Island are institutions conducting research around the Port of 
Providence along with the University of Rhode Island’s Coastal Resources 
Center (Becker and Caldwell 2015). At a larger scale is the Infrastructure 
and Climate Network in New England, which brings together practitioners 
and scientists from multidisciplinary fields. This comprehensive regional 
collaboration integrates multiple sectors of the transportation system, 
including ports. 
4.3.2 Strategy 2 – Make regulatory changes to encourage resilience  
4.3.2.1  Description of Strategy 2 
The strategy to make regulatory changes to encourage resilience was 
mentioned by 20/30 respondents (Figure 5). This strategy calls for the 
creation, or enforcement, of legal framework that would support or 
pressure port decision-makers to adapt ports to climate and extreme 
weather events. There were three sub-categories mentioned: (1) Develop 
guidance (from USCG), (2) Regulations force resilience measures, and (3) 
Renovation and upgrades integrate SLR considerations (Table 10). 
Table 10. Make regulatory changes to encourage resilience, and its three sub-categories. 
Numbers in the rows are percentages of the total number (n = 30) of the respondents in each 
decision-maker group that mentioned a strategy in the category at least one time. Colors 
denote high agreement (green), to low agreement (orange), to zero mentions (gray). 









 n = 17 n = 8 n = 5 
Develop guidance (from USCG) 47 25  
Regulations force resilience measures 24 38  
Renovation and updates integrate SLR 
considerations 6 50 20 
Regulatory changes are to be long term in their scope. Because of this, 
respondents suggested that they be based on the best available data (i.e., 
scientific projections about the potential of SLR, storms, etc.). This 
strategy was mentioned in the context of the development of a 30-year 
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long-term master plan and the ports’ continued collaboration with USCG 
guidance and updates on the technology that generates weather-related 
data. One example is the following: 
This [response to a storm or weather impact] is really a whole of 
community approach. When there is a big storm, a hurricane 
tracking, or what is predicted to be a very strong northeastern, the 
USCG captain of the port will get all the major stakeholders 
together. This includes the US Navy, and our folks on the 
operations and the emergency operations side. This also includes 
the boat pilots, some of the major consumers and users of the 
waterfront. They will all get together and . . . set different 
conditions within the port. This is a very prescriptive USCG kind of 
thing. (DIR11)  
Another example is the following: 
Typically, both the state and city need to be involved in resilience 
investments said one respondent, explaining that “. . . to make 
those resilience investments, it might just have to be driven . . . 
the state and the city [need] to start to consider these 
adaptations.” (ES2).  
4.3.2.2  Responses by decision-maker type 
A total of 12 directors, 7 environmental specialists, and 1 safety planner 
mentioned make regulatory changes to encourage a resilience strategy 
(Figure 5). The only distinction in their responses was that both the 
directors and the environmental specialists mentioned this in the context 
of developing guidance from the USCG and regulatory changes, while the 
safety planner’s response focused on how adaptation could be addressed 
by factoring in SLR when renovating facilities in the future: “Youll see as 
facilities are renovated or new facilities are constructed, that they will 
factor in SLR.” (SP6) 
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4.3.3 Strategy 3 – Conduct risk assessments 
4.3.3.1 Description of Strategy 3 
Conduct risk assessments as a strategy to overcome barriers to adaptation 
was mentioned by 17/30 respondents (Figure 5). The strategy is defined as 
the action of documenting, and acknowledging, the risk factors at a port — 
a fundamental step in understanding the vulnerability of a port and its 
facilities. 
There are three sub-categories within this barrier: (1) Learn from 
experiences, (2) Train for emergency response, and (3) Undertake holistic 
risk assessments (Table 11).  
Table 11. Conduct risk assessments, and its three sub-categories. Numbers in the rows are 
percentages of the total number (n = 30) of the respondents in each decision-maker group 
that mentioned a strategy in the category at least one time. Colors denote high agreement 
(green), to low agreement (orange), to zero mentions (gray). 








 n = 17 n = 8 n = 5 
Learn from experience with storms 47 63 60 
Train for emergency response 6 25  
Undertake Holistic Risk Assessment 6 75 40 
Having learned from the recent passing of Hurricane Sandy (2012) 
(Appendix G), some respondents indicated that they are making resiliency 
upgrades. Comments from directors include “You know, it was short term, 
but think and extrapolate that SLR projection to a longer-term period and 
you would have flooded terminals on a frequent basis. [That frequency of] 
 
Environmental specialists and safety planners favored regulatory 
changes as a needed strategy for adaptation (Figure 5). The role of 
governance – responsible actors that are actively engaged cannot 
be underestimated. In the absence of active leadership in port 
resilience efforts, regulatory changes that align with a resilience 
mandate could influence the allocation of resources to both 
safeguard the port and serve the surrounding areas and 
communities.  
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flooding . . . would interrupt the free flow of goods regularly” (DIR11). “To 
address SLR, the only thing I can think of is taking the current port 
management plan that we have and try to adapt it based on [the need for] 
higher grounds” (DIR3). Other directors and safety planners had similar 
comments: 
Our city has a dedicated marine unit in the police department and 
the fire department also owns vessels that they use to train on a 
regular basis. They have docks so that they can put out fires on 
vessels or on shoreline infrastructure. There is also a diving team 
that trains regularly for search and rescue . . . (DIR5). 
. . . the port has done some assessments and they are 
incorporating it [information from the assessments] into long-
term planning . . . We did an assessment for the port and there 
was a location where they wanted to put an IT [information 
technology] backup. They wanted to use a small building, and 
when they realized that that could flood just a little bit, they 
decided to move it elsewhere . . . (SP6) 
The port is trying to avoid … an unexpected occurrence that 
causes the shutdown of operations in the middle of the day and 
results in a logistics nightmare. The goal is . . . to eliminate the 
disruption or the potential for the disruption. (SP6) 
A port’s facilities, warehouses, and even their stormwater management 
systems are candidates for impact, as one director says, “If we had a storm 
like Sandy, I would fear the warehouse would be impacted at its current 
elevation level” (DIR4). Another spoke in more detail about what his port 
is doing: 
Part of the projects that we are working on—we are handling some 
stormwater management upgrades on our docks, on our wharfs—
we are getting CDS [Continuous Deflective Separation] units, 
which handle floatables, and we are also rebuilding our wharves 
to handle surges/flood issues. So, we have been working on that 
and we have been incorporating the thought process [on SLR risk 
and how to prepare for them] into our projects as we move 
forward. (DIR4) 
Some port decision-makers mentioned the importance of training in 
emergency response and conducting drills on the deployment of 
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protecting-devices such as “. . . aqua-fans devices and armor[ing] certain 
facilities and buildings with them” as early actions to protect against those 
things that could happen immediately (DIR28). “Since super-storm Sandy, 
we . . . purchased the aqua fences, all ready to be deployed around 
substations, transformer facilities and [have taken] other measures both in 
the port and at the airport” (DIR28).  
Another spoke of the need to ensure the individuals procuring new 
resilient equipment or designing more resilient facilities know what is 
needed and they “understand what it needs to have to make it resilient and 
to make it conform with the long-term viability [of the port]” (DIR11).  
4.3.3.2  Responses by decision-maker type 
Eight directors, six environmental specialists, and three safety planners 
mentioned conducting risk assessments as a strategy (Figure 5). The 
environmental specialist and the safety officers put a higher emphasis on 
this strategy than did directors, highlighting lessons learned from 
Hurricane Sandy (2012) and the need to not only focus on a similar impact 
but to undertake a more holistic risk assessment. Of all the responses, 
environmental specialists were more systematic in their approach to 
understanding resilience. They integrated concepts from engineering, 
mentioned the use of three-prong approach, and highlighted the need for 
more data to run risk models and cost-benefit analysis. The three-prong 
approach includes (1) wherever possible, relocate non-essential activity 
out of the flood plain; (2) if that was not possible, commit to elevate 
structures and sensitive infrastructure two feet above the hundred year 
flood plain for their basin; and (3) if that is not possible, then make sure 
that moving forward, new upgrades were better, and used non-corrosive, 
stronger materials that can hold up to extreme weather. 
Having information is important, one respondent mentioned, “I think, 
from a planning perspective, it would be helpful to have more information 
to run the models on risk and cost-benefit based on risk” (ES10). “We just 
did finish a resiliency study . . . and it was looking at some of the hard 
infrastructure and potential issues we could have here for tidal surge and 
flooding. (ES12). Another environmental specialist spoke about how 
conducting risk assessments helped them better understanding the risk: 
The potential for impact has been presented to leadership in the 
city’s staff, and we now have a better idea of how to talk about 
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adaptation . . . Taking a three-pronged approach at a concept 
level, we now have a better understanding of the engineering and 
what we need to do; we have a better understanding of what the 
impacts will be; and we are more conversant in the process. 
(ES30) 
4.3.4 Strategy 4 – Develop financial incentives 
4.3.4.1 Description of Strategy 4  
Development of financial incentives was mentioned by 15/30 
respondents as a strategy (Figure 5). These included eight port directors, 
six environmental specialists and one safety officer. Respondents in this 
study perceived that financial incentives could facilitate needed 
adaptations at the port. The political nature of local government means 
that all decisions, including climate adaptation, are affected by political 
interests and competing preferences vying for support at the municipal 
scale (Keen et al. 2006).  
Because port resources are generally used for standard maintenance and 
day-to-day operations, it is easier to persuade tenants and others that 
adaptation is worthwhile if there are also financial incentives for making 
adaption(s). Incentives can come from grants or federal or state 
government agencies. One director felt “The only way that we have been 
able to achieve that [adaptation] is through getting funding through the 
federal government” (DIR18).  
Incentives can come also from insurance companies — in the form of 
reduced insurance premiums tied to a port’s increased resilience to 
hazards, as described by two respondents: 
Financial incentive is always an easy driver for a lot of the tenants 
and people within agencies . . . to convince them that [adaptation 
measures] are worthwhile . . . tenants come to us requesting what 
guidelines they should follow, since they are working and 
operating on our facilities . . . I have prescribed to them that they 
discuss [with their insurance provider] whatever requirements are 
pertinent . . . a lot of times the cost saving can be dramatic, even 
just by going up . . . half a foot more in elevation. (DIR23) 
[We need] more financial [incentives] and it would have to be from 
a State or federal level. (DIR3) 
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4.3.4.2  Responses by decision-maker type 
Eight directors, six environmental specialists, and one safety planner 
mentioned the development of financial incentives as a strategy to remove 
the barriers to adaptation. Safety planners summarized this in just two 
words, “money and resources,” what they considered most needed for 
adaptation (SP13).  
4.3.5 Strategy 5 – Use new technology to enhance communication 
networks 
4.3.5.1 Description of Strategy 5 
The use of new technology to enhance communication networks was 
mentioned by 6/30 respondents (Figure 5). These included four port 
directors and two environmental specialists. This strategy refers to 
enhancing available information through the acquisition of real-time data 
or using available models to project weather in advance. For instance, the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the U.S. 
Geological Services, and other agencies provide real-time local weather 
data or modeled projections that increase port decision-makers’ ability to 
predict in advance and prepare for a given weather condition. 
Twenty-four percent of the directors and managers mentioned using new 
technology to enhance communication networks as a strategy to remove 
barriers to adaptation. For example, one director stated, to the important 
role of federal agencies, “We get a lot of information from NOAA, different 
sorts of agencies that monitor buoys and collect data along the coastline, 
and . . . that data are aggregated into information that they can provide for 
us” (DIR 18). Another director elaborated with the following: 
We have NOAA PORTS1 program; it is the physical oceanographic 
real-time system. Basically, we got sensors out there, available to 
the public on the internet, to tell you the exact state of the tides, 
and we have a sensor on the . . . bridge that will tell you the exact 
distance from the bottom of the bridge to the water on that bridge. 
(DIR8) 
                                                                
1 This is a NOAA initiative program, Physical Oceanographic Real Time System (PORTS). For more 
information, go to https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/ports.html. 
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Because we keep track of the weather . . . several times a day . . . we 
know a storm is threatening, we take precautions. (DIR9)  
Twenty-five percent of the environmental specialists mentioned using new 
technology as a strategy to remove barriers to adaptation. They mentioned 
using data networks to inform goals and decision-making. In one of the 
ports, the emergency response is orchestrated through a marine instant 
response team that coordinates different sides of port operations and port 
safety personnel, connecting with agencies both outside and inside of the 
port. Several environmental specialists spoke on this issue: 
We are a team of folks, and we have a marine instant response 
team on the terminal that coordinates with our safety folks and 
operations folks. I get involved from time to time as well. Our 
development coordinator gets involved . . . Basically, you have 
some representatives there from each terminal, representing each 
department for the most part. Then they coordinate with outside 
entities like the USCG or the Department of Emergency 
Management (DEM) at the state level. (ES 12) 
4.3.5.2  Responses by decision-maker type 
Decision-makers in this study mentioned different short-term actions that 
were being implemented to increase the resilience of their ports to natural 
hazards. Some of these included implementing best management practices 
and procedures and updating port management plans to include risk 
assessments or putting in place a Risk Assessment of Critical 
Infrastructure document. Environmental specialists also saw the potential 
in ports to become greener and more sustainable, playing their part in 
being supportive of green industries. As an example, ports are taking steps 
to reduce their carbon footprint by encouraging the acquisition of new 
trucks. Some ports are capitalizing on the transportation of wind turbine 
equipment, and there was mention of leveraging the port’s building space 
for solar power industries. One environmental specialist mentioned how 
using the port infrastructure as a resource could potentially help them 
finance climate and extreme weather adaptation. 
Other short-term actions include implementing pier rehabilitation 
projects, raising the pier to FEMA standards (or above when resources are 
available), and conducting flood mitigation projects. To address 
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adaptation, the strategies to assist port decision-makers in removing or 
managing the existing barriers were assessed. 
The results of this study represent a subset of decision-makers for 15 
medium-use and high-use ports in the North Atlantic. Responses on 
climate and extreme weather adaptation barriers and strategies need to 
consider the location and geographical conditions as relates to the natural 
hazards that ports are experiencing. More work is needed to integrate a 
larger number of port stakeholders in the conversation, to make clear 
connections not only on what the barriers are but also on who has the 
responsibility to remove them (Biesbroek et al. 2013). Efforts should 
expand to understand risk both at the port and their neighboring 
communities. The development of the approach and research methods 
used in this study can be used in other regions to measure consensus on 
barriers to adaptation and the strategies. 
ERDC/CHL CR-19-?? 51 
5 Recommendations 
As more studies address processes and challenges of implementing climate 
and extreme weather adaptation, the imperative to understand barriers at 
the port level is still fairly new. This study addresses the need to quantify 
barriers to understand the ability of ports, and communities, to adapt to a 
threat of coastal hazards. Earlier sections summarized port decision-
maker perceptions of the barriers to climate and extreme weather 
adaptation and their opinions on strategies to help overcome these. This 
section reflects on some of those results and provides recommendations to 
help decision-makers address adaptation barriers. 
 Although barriers to adaptation will always exist, the magnitude of 
damages in the coasts and critical infrastructure can be reduced through 
the implementation of climate and extreme weather adaptations (Füssel 
2007). Hence, U.S. port operators, who hold the primary responsibility for 
resilience planning (Becker and Caldwell 2015), can minimize the port’s 
vulnerability to natural hazards by implementing adaptation strategies 
(Nicholls et al. 2008).  
The presence of adaptation barriers in the decision-making process is not 
unexpected. However, barriers, especially those that are social in their 
nature, can be overcome through political will (Adger et al. 2008), through 
support, resources, and effort (Moser and Ekstrom 2010). In the past, as 
ports developed and built their infrastructures, decision-makers used 
probabilities and projections known to them and invested in technologies 
and energy sources that were available then. With current changes in 
climate and extreme weather events, the uncertainty of these events 
increases the risks and vulnerability of ports, coastal infrastructures and 
their communities. 
This study specifically addresses port decision-makers’ barriers to 
adaptation because decision-makers play a significant role in reducing 
risks and building the resilience of their ports. Port decision-makers 
already know that failure to implement climate and extreme weather 
adaptation would result in the following:  
• ports being vulnerable to floods, wind impacts, more severe storms, 
etc. 
• loss of business due to shutdowns 
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• loss of connections to other infrastructure (i.e., roads, rail).  
By participating in addressing barriers to adaptation and seeking to 
understand the risks and the benefits of adaptation, the three decision-
maker categories directors, environmental specialists and safety planners 
can enhance the resilience of their ports. In the recommendations that 
follow, the concerns that the decision-makers highlighted (Figure 3) are 
matched with some of their identified strategies (Figure 5) and adaptation 
approaches identified in the literature. Often times, addressing one 
adaptation barrier will overlap with solving for other barriers. 
To address the barriers of lack of understanding of the risks and 
governance disconnect, port decision-makers could (1) institutionalize 
climate and extreme weather adaptations, (2) conduct risks and 
environmental assessments, and (3) foster collaborations. 
5.1 Institutionalize climate and extreme weather adaptations 
Institutionalizing adaptations generally means including such strategies in 
management plans, along with strategic plans and budgets to allocate 
resources for adaptation and mitigation (Zambrano-Barragán et al. 2010). 
These two barriers of concern are best addressed by making regulatory 
changes, changes that require stable local leadership (Ekstrom and Moser 
2014), and support from higher levels of governance (Rudberg et al. 2012), 
as well as establishing an institutional framework to address adaptation on 
an ongoing basis. 
One of the most important steps a government can take to prepare for 
present and future extreme weather events is “the inclusion of adaptation 
and mitigation in annual operative plans and budget allocations” 
(Zambrano-Barragán et al. 2010; page 1). Climate adaptation will always 
be affected by political interest contesting for support from municipalities 
(Keen et al. 2006) because regulatory change strategies are most often 
long term in their scope, and political agendas are short term in their 
scope, the inherent uncertainty of climate projections makes this difficult 
(Stocker 2013). 
The role of port directors, their leadership and direction in the processes 
of adaptation, is critical to the reduction of risks at the port level. In the 
absence of an appointed state individual who oversees climate and 
extreme weather actions, port directors can (1) appoint individual(s) that 
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can lead and coordinate climate and extreme weather adaptation in their 
ports and (2) together, the director, the appointed individual(s) — or a 
committee — can draft a framework for the planning and inclusion of 
other port stakeholders. These steps would serve to outline collaborations 
and links to information on national weather, availability of funds and 
opportunities, and research collaborations. 
Zambrano-Barragán et al. (2010) stated that to address the adaptation 
barriers, strategies should include the development of flexible social 
institutional frameworks as a basis for decision-making, and the 
development of policies that are based on experience, that are relevant to 
many possible future scenarios, as well as be informed of numerous 
factors affecting societal change (Rayner and Malone 1998; Sarewitz and 
Byerly 2000). An inspired leadership, Burch writes, could significantly 
change the context of decision-making by establishing innovative 
governance models (Burch 2010).  
Institutionalizing climate and extreme weather adaptations also addresses 
decision-makers concerns for lack of funding and physical constraints, 
given that mitigation and adaptation would be included in annual budgets. 
Although this pilot study does not investigate or present current policies 
on climate and extreme weather adaptation for ports, the understanding 
and characterization of barriers need to be seen in the context of available 
policy options (Lempert et al. 2004) and in the context of societal changes 
(Rayner and Malone 1998; Sarewitz and Byerly 2000). Making regulatory 
changes was recorded as the second (20/30 frequency in responses; Figure 
5) strategy to overcome adaptation barriers. This strategy was of great 
importance to environmental specialists who see the port within a system 
that is interconnected with the environment. 
It is noted in the literature that decision-makers often consider and adopt 
adaptation strategies that are in alignment with their own values and 
political interests. Decision-making is influenced by “how people perceive, 
interpret, and think about risks and their management, what information 
and knowledge they value,” etc. (Moser and Ekstrom 2010; page 22,029). 
To decrease the lack of understanding, increase communication and 
address why the perceptions of risk do not exceed an action threshold 
decision-makers could do the following: 
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• Conduct risk and environmental assessments 
• Foster collaborations. 
5.2 Conduct risks and environmental assessments 
Port environmental specialists and safety planners would have a 
role to play in the development of ongoing risks and environmental 
management plans. Environmental specialists, in this study, highlighted 
lack of understanding of risks and physical constraints as the top barriers 
of concerns. Safety officers mentioned that perceived risks did not meet an 
action threshold and the lack of funding as the barriers of most concern to 
them. All decision-makers saw opportunities and benefits for establishing 
collaborations and partnerships with researchers and people in 
government agencies who could help them increase their understanding of 
climate change and extreme weather impacts, as well as elaborating risk 
management plans for their ports that integrate data from government 
sources. As Biesbroek et al. (2011) identified earlier, there is great need for 
public and government support in climate adaptations. 
Safety planners in this study — perhaps — being more cognizant of risk 
conditions at their ports, rather than highlighting the need for conducting 
risk assessments, most frequently mentioned fostering collaborations and 
making regulatory changes as strategies to overcome adaptation barriers. 
Fankhauser et al. (1999) mentioned that decision-making processes that 
provide the right information, resources, and skills to people can increase 
their resilience and ability to adapt to climate change in a reliable manner. 
Collaborative research and information gathering can provide guidance 
that is key to decision-making process under uncertainty (Zambrano-
Barragán et al. 2010). Some climate-related information like 
meteorological data, models, and predictions, together with historical, 
geographical, and socio-economic information, are central for adaptation 
processes (McGray et al. 2007). 
While it may be impossible to eradicate uncertainty, the acquisition of 
knowledge could turn reactive responses into proactive planning. Through 
a better understanding of weather trends and frequency probabilities, 
decision-makers can respond to storm events by delivering effective 
strategies that reduce risks and respond to present and future climate and 
extreme weather changes in an informed manner. 
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5.3 Foster collaborations  
To foster collaborations and establish partnerships are the base of 
decision-making for climate and extreme weather adaptation (present and 
future). Aside from mentioned collaborations with academics and 
government agencies, decision-makers benefit from the guidance and 
feedback from policy makers and insurance providers. One of the greatest 
advantages of collaborations is the shared burden of plans and actions, 
where resources, time investments, and expertise can be shared 
(Zambrano-Barragán et al. 2010).  
Reaching out to others, port decision-makers can learn to maximize future 
investments and become aware of best available data that enable them to 
make informed decisions. This can be instrumental for the development 
and implementation of resilient strategies that are effective in reducing 
risks of ports to climate and extreme weather impacts. There will be port 
administrations and decision-makers that have not yet experienced an 
extreme event. Furthermore, public engagement brings stakeholders to the 
forefront. Stakeholders’ involvement in participatory forums and 
programs is key to early identifying local concerns. Participatory processes 
strengthen the social and political base for effective implementation of 
policies and decisions that consider general priorities of all, the short-
term, long-term responses and tradeoffs of the decision-making processes 
(Zambrano-Barragán et al. 2010). 
Conducting risk and environmental assessments are closely intertwined 
with fostering collaborations and partnerships because of shared interests. 
Through these collaborations there is an opportunity for technology and 
innovation, the use and development of existing tools, and strategies and 
mechanisms to enhance operations and communication. An increase in 
the institutional capacity and the knowledge of potential risks paves the 
way for planning strategically; addressing concerns and infrastructures 
vulnerabilities on a regular basis would make the problem of climate and 
extreme weather impacts less overwhelming. 
Because decision-making itself can be a barrier to adapting to climate and 
extreme weather, decision-makers play a significant role in reducing risk 
and building the resilience of their ports. As noted by the National 
Research Council (NRC), effective adaptations for climate change need all 
types of decision-makers and stakeholders to participate (NRC 2010). 
Increasing institutional capacity in the ports can promote the 
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advancement of informed decision-making guidance and knowledge 
needed to execute on adaptation planning and risk management. In the 
table below, additional recommendation actions are outlined for each 
different decision-maker type (Table 12). 
Table 12. Other recommended actions that port decision-makers can take in function of their 
positions at the ports. 
Port Directors and Managers Environmental Specialists Safety Planners 
(1) Work with regulatory agencies 
to develop regulatory changes that 
encourage resilience and provide 
financial incentives. 
(1) Integrate climate risk 
assessments into the port 
management plan. 
(1) Integrate climate risk 
assessment into the port 
management plan. 
(2) Lead managers, port operators, 
and others in organizing and 
establishing working groups and 
developing emergency response 
strategies (flood barriers, etc.) 
(2) Organize working 
groups to address climate 
risk. 
(2) Organize working 
groups to address climate 
risk. 
(3) Promote learning opportunities, 
acquisition of data, and 
communication tools to enhance 
understanding of risks. 
 (3) Organize drill exercises 
to enhance the ability of 
port personnel to respond 
to natural disasters. 
(4) Direct working groups to update 
port master plans to include 
relevant SLR projections and/or to 
develop risk assessments. 
  
An incremental approach to adaptation strategies can be thought of as 
“extensions of actions and behaviors that already reduce the losses that 
can enhance the benefits of natural variations in climate and extreme 
events” (Kates et al. 2001). Directors, environmental specialists, and safety 
planners, together with port administrators and a growing number of 
informed stakeholders, in time and with practice, can achieve a balance in 
the implementation of the adaptation processes, understanding the 
barriers, evaluating possible strategies, and carrying out their 
implementation and evaluation.  
The contribution of this research builds and integrates knowledge on port 
decision-makers’ barriers to adaptation and strategies to help them 
remove these. The results of this study represent a subset of decision-
makers for 15 medium-use and high-use ports in the North Atlantic. 
Responses on climate and extreme weather adaptation barriers and 
strategies need to consider the location and geographical conditions as 
relates to the natural hazards that ports are experiencing. More work is 
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needed to integrate a larger number of port stakeholders in the 
conversation, to make clear connections not only on what the barriers are 
but also on who has the responsibility to remove them (Biesbroek et al. 
2013). Efforts should expand to understand risks at the port and their 
neighboring communities. The development of the approach and research 
methods used in this study can be used in other regions to measure 
consensus on barriers to adaptation and the strategies. 
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6 Conclusions  
The results of this pilot study suggest that North Atlantic medium- and 
high-use port decision-makers’ perceived barriers to climate and extreme 
weather adaptation fall into seven categories, and their proposed 
strategies to address fall into five categories. The 30 interviewed port 
decision-makers have consensus on the barriers that prevent them from 
implementing resilient adaptations. This shared agreement is fundamental 
for the understanding of risks to storms and extreme weather events that 
are impacting, and will continue to impact, coastal infrastructures. Port 
authorities and port administrators, together with state, federal, and 
private agencies, can help port decision-makers in planning actions to 
reduce or remove the barriers to increase the resilience of their ports in a 
holistic manner. Through the fostering of collaborations, the burden of 
plans and actions (resources, time investment, and expertise) can be 
shared. Greater involvement of port tenants, and diverse port 
stakeholders, would increase the understanding of the risks and generate a 
greater sense of responsibility. A first step in the process of resilience 
building is drafting/revising emergency management plans and/or risk 
assessment plans. 
Barriers to adaptation will always exist. However, today’s decision-making 
will increase or decrease the future adaptive capacity of the country’s 
ports. The ability to take gradual steps in incremental adaptations will 
better prepare port administrators in sustaining their missions while 
facing increasingly challenging climate conditions and increasing extreme 
weather incidents. Port decision-makers should reach out to policymakers, 
insurance providers, and others to help maximize future investments and 
extend the resilience and lifetime of the ports’ infrastructure. 
By interviewing different key experts in each port, consensus on whether 
their ports are threatened by climate and extreme weather events is 
quantified, and the perceived barriers to extreme weather adaptation and 
the concept of seaport vulnerability are characterized. Also, the practices 
and circumstances that are locally relevant across the studied ports can be 
determined. The methodology used in and the insights resulting from this 
pilot study can be applied to other areas/categories in the future, 
providing a road map for tactics to address the adaptation barriers and 
the strategies to address them — addressing the shortfall of adaptation 
strategies for adaptation to extreme weather currently available to ports. 
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Appendix A: Port Decision-Makers’ 
Perceptions on Climate and Extreme Weather 
Vulnerability 
Ground truthing in this study follows the development of a quantitative 
vulnerability index for ports (McIntosh et al. 2019). The index can be used 
to assess relative vulnerability measurements across multiple ports, 
identifying those at higher risk to impacts from extreme weather events. 
Along with the vulnerability index, identification of barriers to extreme 
weather adaptations can help in understanding the concerns that may 
impede the development of resilient ports. The value of the model is 
strengthened by ensuring the results capture stakeholders’ input and local 
circumstances and practices. This helps in identifying the barriers to 
adaptation that are most relevant to those working in a port. Further, the 
involvement of decision-makers in the development process increases the 
likelihood that study outputs will be integrated into their local decision-
making processes. 
Responses by decision-makers on their understanding of the vulnerability 
of the ports were organized using the IPCC definition of vulnerability 
(Appendix E). 
Although all groups mentioned vulnerability in terms of adaptive capacity, 
the assessment on decision-makers’ perceptions of the concept of port 
vulnerability found that a majority (80%, 24/30) explain it in terms of 
exposure and sensitivity (Table A-1). However, safety planners had the 
largest percentage of its group (80%, 4/5) link vulnerability and adaptive 
capacity. An explanation could be that these individuals, who address port 
safety daily, most clearly see the connection between adaptive capacity and 
the ability to respond to an extreme weather event.  
Table A-1. Distribution of the responses by the three categories of decision-makers. Values 
are presented in the percentages for each group of respondents. The total number of 




(N = 17) 
Environmental 
specialists (N = 8) 
Safety Planners  
(N = 5) 
Exposure 82.4% 75% 80% 
Sensitivity 70.6% 87.5% 100% 
Adaptive Capacity 17.6% 25% 80% 
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Port exposure to climate and extreme weather events was explained in 
terms of exposure to SLR, high winds, blizzards, and flooding events that 
could impact the physical infrastructure, facility, and cargo and that could 
also affect vessels, people, and systems. Disruptions would slow down, 
delay, or prevent the port’s functioning, affecting the economic viability of 
the port and its ability to deliver goods. Together with the port, waterfront 
properties, waterways, and marshlands are also viewed as vulnerable and 
exposed. Similarly, in sensitivity terms, these surrounding areas, local 
population, and key ecosystems would have a higher frequency of rain, 
storm, and surge impacts. Beyond impacts to physical infrastructure, 
extreme events also generate social and economic impacts. Depending on 
the nature and verity of the storm and the force of winds, the port’s 
function could be delayed or crippled. The weather event could also cause 
long-term physical damage and shut downs. Stored cargo could be 
destroyed or lost. Coasts could experience erosion, and channels could 
accumulate more than the usual sediments.  
This appendix explains that a port’s level of vulnerability, in terms of 
adaptive capacity, is strongly tied to its decision-makers’ understanding of 
the risks and potential impacts and acting upon that knowledge. This is of 
interest to this study, as the adaptive capacity element of the vulnerability 
component had the lowest ranking during the expert evaluation process 
(McIntosh et al. 2019). As mentioned earlier, study respondents most often 
explained vulnerability in terms of a port’s exposure and sensitivity. Few 
explained it in terms of adaptive capacity (Table A-1 of this Appendix A).  
In addition to explaining vulnerability as it relates to climate and extreme 
weather (Table A-2), some respondents mentioned their concern that the 
port’s tank farms could be vulnerable to terrorism.  
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Table A-2. Decision-makers’ perceptions on the vulnerability of ports. 
Vulnerability Component Decision-Makers’ Vulnerability Perceptions 
Exposure 
Exposure to natural hazards, SLR, higher frequency of 
rain, storm surge, floods, heavy wind, blizzards. 
 
Impacts on physical infrastructure (e.g., tank farms), 
water ways, waterfront properties, coastal degradation, 
connectivity systems, peoples, the economy.  
 
In general terms, impacts on port functions, damage to 
facility equipment (e.g., containers knocked down by 
heavy winds), disruption of connectivity systems (e.g., 
trains over marshlands), delivery of goods. (Impacts 
may vary as a function of the age of infrastructure.) 
Sensitivity  
Sensitivity to natural hazards (see exposure). 
Impacts on physical infrastructure (tank farms, 
containers), coastal landscapes, navigation, 
accumulation of sediments in the channels. 
 
Degree of impacts. The sensitivity of the port is a 
function of the severity of nature (e.g., what the storm 
brings). 
This is also influenced by the elevation of the 
landscape, age of infrastructure at the port. 
Once impacted, ports are affected with delays, 
damage, destruction, loss or crippling of the port’s 
functions. 
When ports lose their connections to people and 
waterways, this results in economic loss, shut downs, 
absence of goods (e.g., heating oil). Hence, all port 
stakeholders and their connection systems are 
susceptible,  
Adaptive Capacity 
In general terms, port is described as being prepared, 
having knowledge and awareness of risks, having the 
ability to restore functions and ensure business 
continuity. 
 
Planning. Knowledge that mitigation makes a 
difference in the port’s vulnerability 
 
Active. Port has a contingency plan or an Office of 
Environmental Management. 
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Appendix B: Communication Inviting 
Participants 
Subject: **IMPORTANT** URI Seaport Resilience Project  
 
Dear Decision maker [Name], 
My name is Dr. Elizabeth Mclean; I am a research associate in the 
University of Rhode Island’s Marine Affairs Department, where I specialize 
in port resilience and extreme weather adaptations. At URI we are conducting a 
series of interviews with port representatives as part of a funded study with the USACE's 
Engineer Research & Development Center to understand seaport vulnerability to extreme 
weather events.  
We are speaking with key port decision makers about long term planning and investment 
for resilience (see attachment). We are interviewing port directors/ managers, safety 
planners and environmental risk specialists at the 23 medium and high-
use ports of the USACE North Atlantic Division who have knowledge about extreme weather 
planning and/or investments. Ten ports have already participated in our study. Please let us 
know when you are available, your input is highly valued and essential to this research! 
I can be reached at 401-874-7083. 




Elizabeth L. Mclean PhD, Research Associate | Department of Marine Affairs | Coastal Institute | University of Rhode 
Island 
1 Greenhouse Road, Suite 205, Kingston, RI 02881 | Email: elmclean@uri.edu | Phone: 401-874 -7083 | Web: 
http://web.uri.edu/abecker/dr-elizabeth-mclean/ 
“A mechanism of world intercommunication will be devised, embracing the whole planet, freed from national hindrances 
and restrictions, and functioning with marvelous swiftness and perfect regularity.” Shoghi Effendi 1936 
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Appendix C: Project One-Pager Description 
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Mclean & Becker 
Decision Maker Barriers to Extreme Weather Adaptation for Seaports: A 
Cultural Consensus Model for Medium and High-Use Ports in the North 
Atlantic 
Demographics 
1. Name of the port                                                              ________________ 
2. What is your position? _______________________________________ 
3. Number of years you have been working as a port manager/safety 
planner/environmental specialist? _______ 
Understanding Barriers 
4. Do you feel your port has done enough to address extreme weather concerns? (why or 
why not?) 
_______________________________________________________ 
5a. Does your port have a management plan that considers long - term planning for 
natural hazards resilience? (Y/N) ___  
 5b. Are there some short-term actions to be planned to increase resilience? 
_______________________________________________________ 
5c. Which, if any, extreme weather impacts does this address? Which other 
natural hazards? ____________________________________________ 
6. What are some of the challenges to implement extreme weather adaptation actions at 
your port? 
_______________________________________________________ 
7. You mentioned challenges to implementing adaptation actions (Q7). What resources 
would enable you to overcome these challenges? ________________________ 
8. What could happen to your port if needed adaptations to extreme weather were not 
addressed? 
_______________________________________________________ 
Conceptualizing Seaport Vulnerability to extreme weather impacts (the CCM) 
1. What does “seaport vulnerability to extreme weather impacts” mean to you? 
_______________________________________________________ 
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2. Which components of the physical infrastructure of your port are exposed to: 
 a. extreme weather tide-related flooding? ___________________ 
 b. surge damage? ______________________________________ 
 c. or extreme temperatures? _________________________________ 
3. How would the exposure of your port change with a predicted sea level rise of 2 feet in 
the next two years? 
_______________________________________________________ 
4. How does your port prepare for an imminent storm (Adaptive Capacity)? 
_______________________________________________________ 
5. Compared to other ports in the North Atlantic, what is one thing your port is doing 
well to increase its ability to prepare to extreme events or natural hazards?  
6. Sensitivity is explained by the level to which a system is changed or affected. This can 
cause problems or lead to new opportunities. What facilities of your port do you consider 
to be sensitive to extreme weather impacts? ____________________________ 
7a. How do you think your port would cope if the sea level would rise by 2 feet in 2020? 
_______________________________________________________ 
    7b. How does this prediction change in the face of a storm? _____________________ 
8. The following natural hazards are already impacting some ports in the US. Which ones 
are you most concerned about? How would you rank them? (4, high – 0, low): 
 __ Extreme Temperatures 
 __ Extreme Precipitation 
__ Sea level rise 
__ Extreme Coastal Storms (high winds and surge) 
__ Tidal flooding 
Other: 
_____________________________________________________ 
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Appendix E: Terminology Used in the Study 
Adaptation is defined as “any adjustment in natural or human systems in 
response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which 
moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities”(IPCC 2012).  
Barriers are defined as factors that delays or prevents actions and plans to 
implement an adaptation, or an investment towards resilience. 
Cultural Consensus Model is a method used in the social sciences to 
distinguishe patterns of socially transmitted knowledge that people use to 
interpret the world and make decisions ((Romney et al. 1987)). It uses a 
mathematical model to derive estimates of experts competence and 
cultural shared knowledge ((Romney et al. 1987)). 
Decision-makers for the purpose of this study, consist of port directors or 
managers, safety planners, and environmental specialists charged with 
decision-making in the chosen ports. 
Indicators are measurable, observable quantities that serve as proxies for 
an aspect of a system that cannot itself be directly, measured (Gallopin 
1997; Hinkel 2011).  
Resilience is the capacity to prepare, resist, recover, and adapt to a 
disturbance, such as a major storm event (CARRI 2013; Rosati et al. 2015). 
Also, Walker posits the “ability of a system to absorb disturbance and still 
retain its basic function and structure” (Walker et al. 2006). 
Risk is the probability of an event to damage critical components of the 
infrastructure. Although potential outcomes are often uncertain (IPCC 
2014), these are often measured monetarily as it relates to the physical 
components of a facility/system, loss of function (interruptions), cost 
repair, and stabilizing conditions (debris removal, etc.). 
Seaport here collectively refers to the collocated real property and 
infrastructure involved in the loading and unloading of cargo from 
maritime vessels. These are port, facilities, locks, etc. Lacking a universally 
accepted method for delimiting for port boundaries, and recognizing that 
some seaports span multiple counties, this study of port vulnerability 
considers a port as an inextricable part of its local socioeconomic and 
environmental systems. 
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Vulnerability is defined as “the propensity or predisposition to be 
adversely affected . . . including the characteristics of a person or group 
and their situation that influences their capacity to anticipate, cope with, 
resist, and recover from the adverse effects of physical events” (IPCC 2012, 
p. 32).  
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Appendix F: Cultural Consensus Model (CCM) 
(output) 
No. of negative competencies: 0 
Largest eigenvalue: 14.282 
2nd largest eigenvalue: 4.905 
Ratio of largest to next: 2.912 
The weak eigen ratio indicates lack of fit to the consensus model--most 





1  0.139 
2  0.456 
3  0.614 
4  0.547 
5  0.729 
6  0.547 
7  0.687 
8  0.527 
9  0.762 
10  0.547 
11  0.981 
12  0.166 
13  0.216 
14  0.981 
15  0.323 
16  0.981 
17  0.762 
18  0.981 
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19  0.476 
20  0.067 
21  0.981 
22  0.981 
23  0.981 
24  0.981 
25  0.610 
26  0.751 
27  0.516 
28  0.729 
29  0.687 
30  0.125 
 
ITEM 1: Governance Disconnect 
 Response Frequency Wtd. Freq. 
 ----------- ----------- ----------- 
 0  10      7.07 
 1   20     22.93 
ITEM 2: Lack of Communication   
 Response Frequency Wtd. Freq. 
 ----------- ----------- ----------- 
0  28     29.51 
1   2     0.49 
 
ITEM 3: Lack of Funding 
 Response Frequency Wtd. Freq. 
 ----------- ----------- ----------- 
0   7     4.20 
1  23     25.80 
 
ITEM 4: Lack of Understanding of Risks 
 Response Frequency Wtd. Freq. 
 ----------- ----------- ----------- 
0   2      1.32 
1  28     28.68  
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ITEM 5: Perceived Risks does not meet Action Threshold 
 Response Frequency Wtd. Freq. 
 ----------- ----------- ----------- 
0   9      5.79 
1  21     24.21 
 
ITEM 6: Physical Constraint 
 Response Frequency Wtd. Freq. 
 ----------- ----------- ----------- 
0  10      6.62 
1  20     23.38 
 
ITEM 7: Problem is Overwhelming 
 Response Frequency Wtd. Freq. 
 ----------- ----------- ----------- 
 0  28     28.83 




Barriers to Adaptation 
 ----------- 
 1   Governance Disconnect 1.00 
 2   Lack of Communication 0.00 
 3   Lack of Funding 1.00 
 4   Lack of Understanding of Risks 1.00 
 5   Perceived Risks does not meet Action Threshold 1.00 
 6   Physical Constraint 1.00 
 7   Problem is Overwhelming 0.00 
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Appendix G: Lessons Learned from the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey 
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Appendix H: Abbreviations and Acronyms  
ADA  American Disabilities Act  
CCM  Cultural Consensus Model 
CENAD Corps of Engineers North Atlantic Division 
DIR  Port Director 
ERDC  U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center 
ES  Environmental Specialist 
FEMA  Federal Emergency Management Agency  
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
NOAA  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
NRC  National Research Council 
SLR  Sea Level Rise 
SP  Safety Planner 
USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers (U.S. government)  
USCG  United States Coast Guard 
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Unit Conversion Factors 
Multiply By To Obtain 
feet 0.3048 meters 
miles (nautical) 1,852 meters 
miles (U.S. statute) 1,609.347 meters 
miles per hour 0.44704 meters per second 
yards 0.9144 meters 
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